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Introduction 
During the last decades, knowledge of the human genome and hereditary mechanisms 
has been proliferated with remarkable speed, and this knowledge has raised possibilities 
especially in the field of medicine. At the moment, it is, for example, possible to 
identify the presence of certain defected genes in the genome of an embryo or an adult, 
and there is an increasing number of genetic therapies for mitigating the effects of these. 
However, the increased possibilities have also raised many hopes that go beyond the 
definition of conventional medicine. An example of these new envisioned technologies 
is genetic enhancement: with genetic enhancement, the practices in medicine would not 
only be used to cure diseases and restore normal human functioning, but also to enhance 
human functioning. This would then result in creating a human or humanity with 
improved characteristics such as intelligence, stamina, or memory.  
These futuristic scenarios raise the question about the proper limits of genetic 
technologies, and the field of the ethics of human genetics is somewhat divided by those 
more liberal towards the use of novel genetic technologies, and those more reserved 
towards them. Much of the anxieties derive from the “old eugenics” that originated in 
the United States at the beginning of the 19th century as a national quest for preventing 
the breeding of those genetically unfit and improving the genetic makeup of the human 
race. Starting as a trend with “Fitter Families” -contests and eugenic education, it 
continued as compulsory sterilizations of 60,000 unfit persons in 29 states. From the 
United States, the eugenic trend was adopted to other countries, for example to Sweden, 
where forced sterilizations were administered between 1934 and 1975. This eugenic 
trend culminated in Germany, where the Nazis enforced the eugenic project as a 
powerful legislation and massacre. (Sandel 2007, 63?8.) 
In the recent work by many influential scholars of the Anglo-American political 
philosophy, the language of eugenics is having a new start with the label of “liberal 
eugenics”, a term that is used by both the proponents and opponents of this trend of 
thought. This new wave of eugenics is said to be fundamentally different from the old 
one, due to its central features that are non-coerciveness, freedom of choice, and state 
neutrality. Mainly it concerns freely made choices about the use of genetic 
enhancements. The liberal eugenicists argue that if coercion and the involvement of 
state as eugenic policymaker were removed, the injurious elements of eugenics would 
be eschewed. They consider that genetic enhancements will increase the domain of 
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individual choice and elevate well-being. (Sandel 2007, 68?75; Agar 1998, 137; 
Buchanan et al. 2001, 42?60.) 
Thus, the discussion about genetic enhancement is on the one hand loaded with anxiety 
and moral disquiet, and on the other hand, with claims for individual rights and hopes of 
better well-being. Ethicists make varying suggestions and predictions concerning 
genetic enhancement and take sides for and against the permissibility and desirability of 
the imagined new technology. However, these scenarios are often outlined without 
thorough philosophical reasoning. Their justifications remain superficial, trusting on 
people’s intuition, or assume certain philosophical premises without justifying these 
premises. For example, if genetic enhancements are advocated based on certain risk-
benefit scenarios or claims of rights, the reason for accepting a consequentialist or 
deontological theory is not argued.  
Michael Sandel’s argument opposing genetic enhancements in his The Case against 
Perfection (2007)  is  an  example  of  a  bioethical  argument  that  lacks  explicit  
philosophical foundation. In his work, Sandel attempts to articulate with the use of non-
religious arguments the reasons why genetic enhancements are morally unjustified as 
such, apart from the difficulties that the application of enhancements could introduce; 
such as safety, fairness, or autonomy.   
Sandel’s central concern is the new control that genetic technologies would enable if 
people were able to influence their own or their progeny’s characteristics. With genetic 
enhancement technology, a person’s genome and characteristics would no longer be a 
result of contingency and chance of the genetic lottery anymore, but an outcome of 
decisions and choices. Sandel argues that this new control and power would generate a 
sense of hyperagency, an overplayed sense of mastery towards one’s capacities and 
existence, as the human vulnerability to the genetic lottery would no longer prevail. 
According to Sandel, the new situation with increased power and adopted hyperagency 
would bring a change in the social meaning of responsibility and solidarity.  
At present, we cannot be held responsible for our genome because of its contingent 
origin. Recognizing this contingency, Sandel argues, we understand that our talents can 
never be considered wholly as our own accomplishment but rather as gifts and 
coincidences. Thus, we are motivated by a sense of solidarity to share our wealth with 
the ones who have had less luck in the genetic lottery. Sandel, however, argues that by 
controlling the genetic lottery, we would be held responsible for our genome and 
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blamed for its deficiencies. Consequently, as the genome would not be in the domain of 
chance anymore, but in the domain of choice, our motivation to share our wealth with 
the disadvantaged would vanish; thus, our sense of solidarity would be eroded. The 
pivotal disadvantage that Sandel emphasizes here is a certain habit of mind and a way of 
being that genetic enhancement would grant.  
In my thesis, I will analyze the premises on which Sandel grounds his analysis of 
responsibility and luck. On what basis does he present that controlling our genome 
would result in increased responsibility and decreased solidarity? Is our willingness to 
assist our fellow citizens dependent on the degree of control they have in the various 
situations? Sandel does not himself provide any further philosophical justifications for 
his assumptions. A more thorough analysis is needed for assessing the validity of his 
argument: controlling our genome with genetic enhancements will result in increased 
responsibility and decreased solidarity. I will carry out this analysis by comparing 
Sandel’s argument to responsibility-sensitive egalitarian theories and their critique. I 
claim that Sandel’s argument shares similar basic premises with these theories and, 
therefore, the critique of responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism can be applied to 
Sandel’s argument. I conclude that Sandel’s argument is not as straightforward as he 
himself expects it to be.  
The  structure  of  my  thesis  is  twofold.  The  chapters  1  and  2  are  explicatory  chapters  
expounding Sandel’s argument and its philosophical background, thus creating the 
essential basis for the following chapters. The chapters 3 and 4 construct the central 
claim  of  my  thesis:  Sandel’s  argument  is  based  on  the principle of responsibility of 
responsibility-sensitive egalitarian theories: unequal outcomes are just if they arise from 
factors for which individuals can properly be held responsible; otherwise they are 
unjust. I claim that because of this shared fundamental premise, the critique of these 
theories can be applied to Sandel’s argument as well.   
In  the  first  chapter,  I  am  going  to  present  Sandel’s  argument  more  thoroughly.  I  will  
start the chapter by introducing the argument in its entirety, and will then proceed by 
focusing especially on Sandel’s conceptions of responsibility, luck and solidarity. In the 
end of the chapter, I am going to present the central discussion concerning these notions 
in Sandel’s argument. It is to be noted that I will focus on Sandel’s notions of 
responsibility, luck and solidarity and leave many other issues in his argument out of 
my consideration.  
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The second chapter connects Sandel’s argument about genetic enhancements with his 
general philosophical thinking. I am going to explore the reason why Sandel gives such 
a determining role to the preservation of solidarity. This reason will be identified with 
Sandel’s philosophical views: he draws from the teleological tradition emphasizing the 
importance of the pursuit of good life and the conceptions of the common good. I will 
demonstrate that, for Sandel, solidarity is a precondition for good life and an intrinsic 
element of the common good. The sense of solidarity entails the feeling of a shared fate, 
a sense of belonging and mutual understanding, and these matters are central to 
Sandel’s communitarian conceptions of good life and good society.  
In the third chapter, Sandel’s argument will be connected to the principle of 
responsibility of responsibility-sensitive egalitarian theories. Before demonstrating this 
connection, Sandel’s compatibility with egalitarian theories must be substantiated first, 
because responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism originates from egalitarian theories. If 
Sandel’s argument would not be compatible with egalitarian theories, the connection 
could remain superficial. Thus, the chapter starts by identifying a shared premise of 
Sandel’s philosophy and the egalitarian theories, especially in that of John Rawls. This 
premise, for which I will use the term the egalitarian basic principle, is the justification 
of redistributive institutions purported to mitigate the contingencies of social and natural 
lotteries. I argue that despite Sandel’s and Rawls’ different philosophical orientations in 
deontology and teleology, they both arrive at this same principle, but through dissimilar 
reasoning: Sandel with a justification related to the common good, and Rawls with a 
justification related to individual rights.  
After this demonstration, it is possible to argue that Sandel’s argument shares premises 
with  responsibility-sensitive  egalitarianism.  I  will  claim  that  the  relation  between  
chance, choice and responsibility that Sandel presents in his argument about genetic 
enhancement is based on the principle of responsibility of responsibility-sensitive 
egalitarianism.  Hence,  the  critique  of  the  principle  of  responsibility  can  be  applied  to  
Sandel’s argument.  
However, I conclude the section by noting that it is not evident that Sandel endorses the 
principle of responsibility, but that his argument shares the basic elements of 
responsibility-sensitive egalitarian theories. As will be demonstrated further, the 
principle of responsibility seems to be incompatible with Sandel’s other philosophical 
thinking. Therefore, it is probable that Sandel merely predicts how solidarity would 
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alter,  without  endorsing  the  principle  of  responsibility  as  such.  Either  way,  his  
argument, normatively or descriptively, includes the principle of responsibility and can 
be criticized along its critique.   
The fourth chapter proceeds with a reconsideration of Sandel’s argument along the 
critique of responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism. I am going to start the chapter by 
introducing Samuel Scheffler’s thorough critique of responsibility-sensitive 
egalitarianism and by presenting Scheffler’s own view of the proper ideal for an 
egalitarian theory. Scheffler argues that the basis for redistributive institutions should 
not be founded on a relation between luck and responsibility, but on a Rawlsian 
conception of primary goods: persons should be entitled to the satisfaction of certain 
basic needs, regardless of the presence or absence of responsibility they have in their 
situations. According to Scheffler, the principle of responsibility in responsibility-
sensitive egalitarian theories is philosophically doubtful and morally dubious because it 
is harsh, unforgiving and insensitive to context.  
At  the  end  of  chapter  4,  I  will  employ  the  critique  that  Scheffler  addressed  to  
responsibility-sensitive egalitarians for the consideration of the notions of chance, 
choice  and  responsibility  in  Sandel’s  argument.  I  will  claim  that  the  relation  of  these  
notions in Sandel’s argument include the philosophically doubtful and morally dubious 
features that Scheffler blames responsibility-sensitive egalitarian theories of: Sandel’s 
reasoning results in a situation in which people, who did not choose to use genetic 
technology for enhancing themselves or their progeny and, therefore, encountered 
unfortunate outcomes, would not be assisted with societal compensations. This scenario 
cannot ensure certain basic needs for the members of the society. If respect and concern 
for the value of all is appreciated in the society, the proper criteria for societal 
compensations should not depend on whether some outcomes of genetic characteristics 
are due to chance or choice, but whether they affect a person’s status as a full member 
of the society. 
In the concluding chapter, I will evaluate the relation between Sandel’s argument about 
genetic enhancements and his other philosophical thinking. I will note that if Scheffler’s 
critique is plausible, the principle of responsibility appears to be incompatible with 
Sandel’s conception of good life: the judgmental element of responsibility-sensitive 
egalitarianism is not the best way to achieve a sense of solidarity and belonging. 
Therefore, the fact that Sandel employs the principle of responsibility in the Case 
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against Perfection is either philosophically inconsistent, if his argument is normative, or 
he outlines an implausible view about the foundations of the society, if his argument is 
descriptive. It remains an open question on what grounds Sandel includes such a 
principle in his argumentation.  
Whether  Sandel  endorses  the  principle  of  responsibility  or  merely  predicts  a  future  
according to it, the assessment of his argument requires that the premises in it are 
analyzed. I will conclude that the relation between responsibility, luck and solidarity 
that Sandel’s presents in his argument about genetic enhancements is at least not as 
straightforward as he presents it to be.  
A couple  of  remarks  are  needed  before  turning  to  the  chapters.  Firstly,  I  wish  to  note  
that my thesis is an argumentative analysis on Sandel’s notions of chance, choice and 
responsibility in his argumentation against genetic enhancement. By criticizing this 
particular part in Sandel’s argument, I do not criticize it in its totality nor argue on 
behalf of genetic enhancements. Secondly, it is important to recall that most genetic 
enhancements are, at present and most likely in the future, mere science fiction. The 
most discussed enhancements, such as the improvement of intelligence or other 
cognitive capacities, are multifactorial traits that are the outcome of complex genetic 
relations as well as environmental and social influence. Even if new interactions 
between specific genes and specific characteristics were discovered, the manipulation of 
some genes will probably never bring the wanted improvements to these characteristics. 
Despite this scientific reality, the question of introducing genetic enhancements is 
philosophically interesting and includes multiple normative questions that are relevant 
in the present society. 
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1. Genetic enhancements and the changing moral landscape 
Michael Sandel (2007) discusses the potential effects that future genetic enhancements 
may induce in our sense of morality and human agency. Sandel grounds his 
argumentation on the moral importance of the genetic lottery, i.e. the contingency of our 
genome’s constitution. According to Sandel, this contingency is the reason why a 
person’s talents can never be considered wholly his own accomplishments but rather as 
gifts and coincidences, for the favorable traits are always at least partly the outcome of 
good luck. He argues that if genetic enhancements were routinely performed and the 
element of luck in the genetic lottery was replaced with choice and control, the moral 
concepts of humility, responsibility and solidarity would deteriorate as the senses of 
hyperagency and mastery were adopted.  
The aim of the first chapter is to present the main lines of Sandel’s argumentation, 
focusing on his notions of responsibility and luck. I will start by presenting the central 
reason why Sandel argues that especially genetic enhancements would change the 
morally relevant distinction between chance and choice: if enhancements were 
introduced, a sense of hyperagency would be emerged and the appreciation of the gifted 
character of human powers and achievements would be lost. In chapter 1.2, I will 
demonstrate Sandel’s conception of the relation between hyperagency and decreasing 
humility, solidarity and a humane conception of responsibility. And in chapter 1.3, I 
will introduce the central discussion concerning Sandel’s prediction about the alteration 
of these moral values. This discussion focuses on the relation between responsibility 
and luck, and on the influence that genetic enhancements could have on societal 
equality.  
1.1. Hyperagency and going beyond normality  
Sandel argues that genetic enhancements especially, not genetic therapy or non-genetic 
enhancements, would be the crucial factor in the emergence of hyperagency1 and the 
erosion of the central moral values of humility, solidarity, and of the humane conception 
of responsibility. Therefore, attention will be given to Sandel’s argumentation on why 
                                               
1 Sandel does not articulate clearly whether or not hyperagency would develop in a passive or active way: 
does it emerge passively or is it adopted actively. On the one hand, Sandel describes with active words 
that hyperagency is an aspiration to remake nature, a pursuit and a drive for mastery and perfection, and 
an impulse to rail against the given. On the other hand, hyperagency seems to something that merely will 
be evolved with genetic enhancements. A plausible explanation could be that along the societal pressures 
to enhance one’s competitiveness, people drift in the adoption hyperagency.  
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genetic enhancements hold a significantly disquieting moral position and induce the 
adoption of hyperagency.   
Sandel defines genetic enhancement as a practice aimed at surpassing normality, rising 
above the norm and reaching beyond health. Making ourselves “better than well” 
indicates the manipulation of our own or our children’s nature by enhancing traits such 
as muscles, memory, moods, height, or physical and cognitive capacities. Thus, 
enhancements are the use of medical means for nonmedical purposes, such as using the 
treatment for Alzheimer-patients for memory enhancement of healthy persons. In 
contrast,  the  purpose  of  medical  treatment  is  to  cure,  prevent  disease,  and  restore  
normality. (Sandel 2007, 5?14.) 
The leading thread in Sandel’s argumentation is that genetic enhancements will cause 
changes in human agency, which is related with the ability to take responsibility for 
one’s actions. Sandel discusses of diminished agency and hyperagency: diminished 
agency is a condition where this responsibility is decreased, whereas hyperagency 
elevates a person’s responsibility of his actions by making him somehow over-capable.   
Diminished agency, which involves the person who is enhanced, is a minor concern to 
Sandel. Due to diminished agency, an enhanced person could not consider himself 
worthy of praise or blame for his being and accomplishments, as the actual credit would 
belong to his designer, be it the parents or the pharmacist. As an extreme case of 
diminished agency, Sandel describes a wholly mechanistic bionic athlete who ceases to 
be a moral agent and becomes a product of his inventor. (Sandel 2007, 25?6.)  
What Sandel regards as the major concern, however, is the emergence of hyperagency. 
If genetic enhancements were conducted, the ones who chose to use genetic 
enhancements would assimilate this agency: 
[T]hey [genetic enhancements] represent a kind of hyperagency, a 
Promethean aspiration to remake nature, including human nature, to serve 
our purposes and satisfy our desires. The problem is not the drift to 
mechanism but the drive to mastery. And what the drive to mastery misses, 
and may even destroy, is an appreciation of the gifted character of human 
powers and achievements. (Sandel 2007, 26?7.) 
By the appreciation of the giftedness of life, Sandel means the recognition and 
acceptance of the existence of the genetic lottery. Due to the contingency in this lottery, 
no  one  can  control  his  genetic  constitution.  Therefore,  we  must  admit  that  our talents 
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and powers are not wholly our own doing, nor even fully ours, despite the efforts we 
make  to  develop  them.  The  sense  of  giftedness  implies  a  respect  for  life  with  the  
acceptance that everything in the world is not at our disposal in the way we desire and at 
our command to serve our purposes. Hence, a certain sentiment of humility is emerged. 
(Sandel 2007, 26?7.) 
Thus, hyperagency is an agency that goes beyond the normal level of human capacities. 
The normal level refers to a belief that the genetic lottery cannot be controlled, and we 
remain vulnerable for the lottery’s contingencies. However, if we controlled the lottery, 
we could overcome this vulnerability. For Sandel, this aspiration to overcome means the 
adoption of a sense of mastery and the losing of a genuine respect for life; the sense of 
giftedness.  
Sandel discusses hyperagency especially in relation to parenting. He concludes that 
parents  ought  to  consider  their  children  to  be  gifts,  accepting  them  as  they  come,  
without positioning them as objects and products of design. The proper virtue in 
parenting is “openness to the unbidden”2, i.e., accepting the contingency of the child’s 
character. This disposition restrains the impulse to master and control that hyperagency 
could promote. As Sandel contends, the deepest moral objection to enhancement lies 
less in the perfection it seeks than in the human disposition it expresses and promotes. 
Designer parents would become arrogant towards the genetic lottery, and they would 
lose the sense of giftedness. (Sandel 2007, 45?7.) 
Sandel does not discuss how diminished agency and hyperagency could appear 
simultaneously, thus, making a person simultaneously over-capable and under-capable. 
This concurrent condition could appear when an adult, who adopts hyperagency because 
he chose to use enhancements for himself, also ends up with diminished agency, 
because his talents are the result of the physician’s actions. Furthermore, an enhanced 
child with a diminished agency would suddenly adopt hyperagency when he reaches 
adulthood and decides to have designer children of his own. However, as further argued, 
Sandel is not concerned with particular situations of enhancements. He does not present 
an argument that would be able to respond to all countering examples and theoretical 
complexities, but rather focuses on a habit of mind and a way of being in a wider sense. 
If Sandel’s agencies are understood as ways of being, and not as some normatively 
                                               
2 The expression openness to unbidden is originally from William F. May, who used this term in his 
comments to the President’s Council on Bioethics (October 17, 2002) (Sandel 2007, 137). 
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significant conditions, the parallel existence of various agencies is more plausible. It is 
possible that a person feels the possession of multiple and even contradictory ways of 
being.  
An important part of Sandel’s argumentation is that the sense of giftedness is 
compatible  with  curing  and  restoring  normality,  even  if  the  genome of  a  person  or  an  
embryo was manipulated.  For Sandel,  the significant difference is that  curing does not 
override natural capacities but improves their flourishing. Even though medical 
treatment intervenes in a person’s “nature”, the motivation is to heal and preserve the 
natural human functions that constitute health. Hence, a hubristic sentiment of mastery 
and control is not attained. (Sandel 2007, 46?7.)  
In validating the moral unease of genetic enhancements, Sandel must justify two 
debatable distinctions: the difference between restoring normality and going beyond it 
with enhancements, and the difference between genetic enhancements and other 
enhancements 3 . In the first distinction, Sandel explicitly rests on the concepts of 
normality and the natural. However, the boundary between disability, normal, and 
beyond  normal  is  certainly  questionable.  Sandel  himself  admits  that  the  essence  of  
normal human functioning is not only a biological question, and is open to an argument 
whether, for example, deafness counts as a disability or as an identity (Sandel 2007, 
47).4  
                                               
3 The liberal eugenicists reject both of these demarcations by arguing that improvements by genetic 
manipulation or by environmental modifications are normatively of the same weight, and that the limit of 
restoring or going beyond normality is of no moral importance. In contrast to Sandel, who wants to 
preserve the natural and normality, they argue that it is morally required to try to improve humanity with 
enhancements. (Agar 1998, 139; Dworkin 2000, 452; Harris 2007, 19?28, 111?2; Savulescu 2001, 
413?425.) 
4 The discussion on normal human functioning is generally based on Christopher Boorse’s definition on 
the normal function model: “[t]he state of an organism is theoretically healthy, e.g. free of disease, insofar 
as its mode of functioning conforms to the natural design of that kind of organism“ (Boorse 1975, 57). 
For example Cathleen Schulte criticizes this model by emphasizing that all the definitions of functions are 
dependent on environmental context and that the conceptions of normality must acknowledge the impact 
the socially created environment has in determining the functional context (Schulte 2010, 102–105). 
Allen Buchanan et al. also discuss the limits of normality related to genetic enhancement and admit that 
natural assets that count as desirable or defective are at least partly determined by the social structure: the 
cooperative dominant framework defines the favoured traits. Different traits will be counted as resources 
in different social environments and depending on various conceptions of goof life. Thus, the notion of 
species-typical normal functioning ought not to be a value-based natural baseline. (Buchanan et al. 2001, 
79?80.) However, they state that the natural baseline has no metaphysical importance, needs no special 
respect by maintaining or restoring it and can be altered over time. They argue that the baseline only has 
relevance as a central criterion for the public conception of what we owe to each other by way of medical 
assistance. (Buchanan et al. 2001, 150?1.) 
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Sandel attempts to draw a line between enhancing and restoring normality by referring 
to the concept of telos. This Aristotelian concept means that every practice has its own 
purpose, goal, and final end (NE 1094a1?19). Sandel argues that defining whether a 
certain act of improvement is enhancing or restoring normality depends on the telos of 
the practice in question. For example, in sports, the relevant matter is the telos of the 
sport in question and the virtues relevant to the game. According to Sandel, the purpose 
and meaning in sports culminate in the honoring of the cultivation and display of human 
beings’ natural talents. Thus, the limit of improving and corrupting depends on what the 
virtues essential to the game are and whether some new technology highlights or 
obscures the talents that distinguish the best players. (Sandel 2007, 37?8.) Likewise, the 
telos of the practice of medicine is in healing and restoring normal human functioning. 
Sandel points out that even if the demarcation of normality was disputed, it is assumed 
that the purpose of medicine is to promote health, not surpass it. (Sandel 2007, 47.) 
Sandel provides many examples from sports to clarify the distinction between 
enhancement and restoring normality. As an uncomplicated example he takes running 
shoes in marathon. As the virtue relevant to the game is running as fast as possible, 
running shoes highlight rather than obscure the excellence that the race is meant to 
display by reducing the risk that runners would confront contingencies unrelated to the 
race, like stepping barefoot on a sharp pebble. In contrast, riding the subway for a part 
of the race clearly would corrupt it. A more complicated example is given from music 
performances, where it is common for musicians to use beta-blockers to keep them calm 
before a show. Defenders argue that using beta-blockers does not make anyone a better 
violinist, but simply removes an obstacle enabling the performers to display their true 
musical gifts. Opponents argue that this is cheating, and state that a part of being a 
musician is to defeat the nervousness and fear in a natural way. Is equanimity a virtue 
intrinsic to music performance? (Sandel 2007, 37?9.)  
However, Sandel’s argumentation based on telos begs the question of normality. If the 
telos is positioned in restoring normality or cultivating natural gifts, the conceptions of 
normal and natural remain open. Sandel, nevertheless, refrains even from the attempt of 
giving a more specific account for normality. Instead, he argues that the diffuse line 
between enhancement and restoring normality does not undermine the meaning of this 
distinction (Sandel 2007, 49). Sandel condemns the attempts to nullify this limit by 
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referring to the sorites paradox5 . This concept originates from the ancient Greece, 
where sophists employed sorites arguments in order to persuade their listeners that two 
separate entities, connected with some continuum, are in reality the same even though 
common intuition would claim otherwise. For example, with baldness, it is impossible 
to say exactly when a person becomes bald: even though it is agreed that having one or 
three hair still counts as bald, the proper number of hairs for not being bald cannot be 
defined. Still, bald and non-bald are not the same. (Sandel 2007, 118.) Likewise, even 
though the proper limit between natural, unnatural and supernatural is indefinite, it does 
not mean that no such limits exist6. 
The second demarcation that Sandel has to justify in order to prove the moral unease of 
genetic enhancements is the difference between genetic enhancements and other kinds 
of enhancements. Sandel himself notices that if the opposition of enhancements is based 
on overriding the natural gifts, the problem is larger than with mere genetic alterations, 
since going beyond normality is also present in widely accepted improvements (Sandel 
2007, 31). These more or less accepted improvements include, for example, altitude 
house training and colossal mass-increasing diets in sports (Sandel 2007 32?5), as well 
as several heavily managed high-pressure child-rearing practices, such as enhancing 
children’s competitiveness with career-focused Ivy-League 7  kindergartens or even 
prescribing Ritalin8 for toddlers to achieve better concentration skills (Sandel 2007, 
58?60). Sandel admits that the line between genetic enhancement, education, and 
training is indeed indefinite and morally less significant than it seems (Sandel 2007, 61).  
However, he turns his justification into a new direction with a parity-of-reasoning 
argument by asserting that the similarities between different practices of enhancement 
fail to vindicate genetic enhancements9. On the contrary, Sandel argues, the similarity 
highlights the problems with other enhancements that heavily strive for leveling up 
performance and competitiveness in the society (Sandel 2007, 51?2).  
                                               
5 Sorites comes from soros, the Greek word for “heap”: even though it cannot be stated how many grains 
count as a heap, there is a difference between a grain and a heap. (Sandel 2007, 118.) 
6 Sandel originally uses the sorites paradox in the debate about the moral status of an embryo or a fetus, 
for disclosing that even though the moment when the morally relevant life begins cannot be defined, it 
still does not mean that a blastocyst and a baby are morally the same (Sandel 2007, 118?9). 
7 Ivy-League is a term for the group of the most appreciated universities in the United States (universities 
of Brown, Columbia, Cornell, Dartmouth, Harvard, Princeton, Pennsylvania and Yale).  
8 Ritalin is a psychostimulant drug, traditionally used in the treatment of attention-deficit hyperactivity 
disorder (ADHD) for improving the patients’ ability to concentrate and perform their daily tasks.  
9 ‘Parity of reasoning’ arguments show that two particular normative positions are morally similar, but 
whether this reasoning ends in restriction or approval depends on the moral intuitions that direct it. For 
Sandel, the similarity between the two normality-surpassing practices means that they should both be 
banned. (Häyry 2010, 225, 233.) 
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In recapitulating Sandel’s argumentation on the moral difference of genetic 
enhancements from the acceptable restoring of normality as well as from other kinds of 
enhancements, it is notable that in neither distinction Sandel is not even trying to be 
specific. With the conception of normality, demanding for precise definitions would 
actually not even be fair because such definitions, especially in a general level, are 
extremely unattainable. A large grey area between restoring normality and going above 
it must be accepted, and Sandel focuses on arguing the moral disquiet of the latter. In 
tracing the line between various enhancements, Sandel appeals to the moral unease 
related to all enhancements reaching too far from the normal functioning of a human 
being, aiming at the powerful boosting of performance in the society. Thus, what 
matters in both distinctions is the intention and requirement of going above normality, 
not the absolute position of some demarcation.  
Hence, the deepest source of moral trouble for Sandel is the impulse of dissatisfaction 
on the current nature of human beings, and the aspiration to perfection, adopted from 
the society’s demands to improve our competitiveness (Sandel 2007, 61). As Sandel has 
articulated, the impulse in question is the drive to mastery, and this sense of 
hyperagency will inflict the significant change in the morally meaningful context of 
chance and choice. Reading Sandel, be it that also other enhancements can increase the 
impulse of hyperagency in people’s life, it is genetic enhancements that amplify this 
agency to a new extent, and definitely produce a novel stance of mastery, when parents 
can, with certainty, affect their progeny’s genetic constitution. While almost every other 
aspect in society is coming more in the power of consumer choice, Sandel stipulates that 
human genome and human nature ought not to be subordinated to this commodification, 
appearing in trait-shopping.  
Sandel understands that using genetic enhancements and mastering our genetic 
constitution are often considered to foster freedom in the human life by increasing the 
effect of control. Nevertheless, he contends that it is actually the opposite of freedom if 
the human nature is transformed in order to fit the world with increasing competitive 
demands, rather than the other way around. Sandel stipulates that true empowerment 
would be adjusting the existing social and political institutions to respect the 
imperfection and limitedness of human beings. (Sandel 2007, 96?7.)  
Sandel has been accused of employing vague, conservative and even religious 
arguments by his critics, who claim a more liberal departure for genetic enhancements. 
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For example, Carson Strong claims that Sandel has only wrapped up a religious 
argument about God given gifts in secular covers (Strong 2005, 30?1). John Harris 
rejects  Sandel’s  argument  in  whole  as  a  mere  skepticism  to  change,  demanding  more  
precise arguments for the reasons exactly why enhancements ought not be delivered and 
the obligation to maximize well-being fulfilled (Harris 2007, 109?119). In addition, 
Frances  M.  Kamm  asks  why  the  benefits  of  enhancing  cannot  be  greater  than  the  
supposed harms in moral sentiments, and condemns the sense of mastery as an adequate 
reason for forbidding enhancements (Kamm 2005, 8?9). As Matti Häyry explicates, it is 
difficult to compare the different parties of the debate because of the separate 
philosophical premises and the disagreement over the value of logical consistency. 
Häyry explains that liberal eugenicists, such as Harris, draw from the tradition of liberal 
consequentialism and demand for rationalism and the avoidance of lofty moral 
arguments. Sandel, on the other hand, descends from the teleological and 
communitarian tradition, emphasizing that the moral issues ought to be holistically 
confronted in their complexity, accepting that they cannot be analyzed in logical, 
reasonable fragments. Hence, Sandel’s starting question about the meaning of life, 
which is encountered more often in religious contexts, is easily arraigned from other 
traditions. (Häyry 2010, 25?31, 232.) 
Sandel recognizes this contradiction but emphasizes that the debate at hand needs to 
transcend  the  traditional  concepts  of  individual  rights  and  utilitarian  cost-benefit  
scenarios in order to be adequate. Sandel urges more existential dimensions in 
considering genetic engineering, and, as presented in this chapter, he is concerned about 
certain habits of mind and ways of being. For Sandel, these dimensions are expressed in 
the cultivation of the proper kind of freedom in our society, thus, fitting the demands of 
society to our nature rather than the other way around, and preserving the essential 
social practices of humility and solidarity. (Sandel 2007, 96.) 
Michael Hauskeller further explicates Sandel’s position. According to Hauskeller, 
Sandel’s main concern is not the harm that enhancements might cause to the one who is 
enhanced, but the harm that enhancing could inflict on the enhancer. Hauskeller 
explains that when A enhances B, B might not be harmed at all, but A always is, 
because A adopts hyperagency and loses his appreciation of the giftedness of human life. 
This is why genetic enhancement is wrong in all situations: enhancing always damages 
humility, humility is a virtue, and preserving virtues is what Sandel’s whole argument is 
about. (Hauskeller 2011, 59?60.) 
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The reason why Sandel’s whole argument is about virtues will be explicated in chapter 
2: Sandel’s philosophy draws from the teleological tradition and is therefore 
concentrated on preserving and cultivating essential virtues of the human life. Section 
1.2, however, will continue to explore Sandel’s argument about genetic enhancements. 
Here I will focus on Sandel’s notions of responsibility and solidarity.  
1.2. Alterations in the moral landscape 
By now, we have seen that Sandel has made efforts to substantiate the moral unease of 
genetic enhancements, that is, the assimilation of hyperagency and a sense of mastery, 
affecting  the  diminishing  appreciation  of  the  gifted  character  of  human  talents  and  
achievements. But what would actually be lost if biotechnology dissolved our sense of 
giftedness? Sandel elucidates that if genetic technology dispelled the sentiment that our 
abilities and accomplishments are the outcome of contingency, pivotal elements in our 
moral landscape would transform. Recognizing the effect of contingency in one’s life is 
the  social  premise  for  humility,  social  solidarity  and  a  humane  conception  of  
responsibility.  Accustomed  to  the  control  over  one’s  own  genome,  the  social  basis  of  
these values would be diminished. (Sandel 2007, 86.)  
By humility, Sandel means the openness to unbidden and the reconciliation that 
everything is not in our dominion. He emphasizes that this disposition should not be 
endorsed only within families, but also in the larger context of societies, thus promoting 
the toleration of dissonance. Being aware of the contingency of our talents and 
recognizing that our abilities are not wholly our own achievement restrains the hubristic 
tendency. However, if the genetic lottery was controlled with genetic engineering, the 
moral position of chance would be replaced with choice, and the sense of humility 
would deteriorate when talents were harder to consider as gifts rather than achievements. 
(Sandel 2007, 86?7.)   
According to Sandel, this new situation with a dominion over our genetic constitution 
would also change the position of individual responsibility, by increasing its 
importance10. As the genome turns into an outcome of choices, parents will encounter a 
new level of liability as they would be responsible for choosing or for not choosing the 
                                               
10 The conception of responsibility is understood in this thesis as it is in Sandel’s prediction about its 
altered meaning, and as it is presented in the responsibility-sensitive egalitarian theories, explicated in 
chapter 3: responsibility is the criterion for assessing whether or not a person should bear the 
consequences in his disadvantageous situation. Thus, responsibility has effects in redistributive measures. 
This conception of responsibility can be contrasted with, for example, moral responsibility, in which 
ascribing praise or blame for a person does not necessarily lead to societal consequences.   
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most pre-eminent traits for their children. As Sandel predicts, parents could even be 
held morally responsible for their children’s possible defects if they declined from 
genetic engineering. He states that the more command is gained over our genetic 
composition, the more we will become responsible for its excellence or deficiency. Thus, 
Sandel concludes that it is a relief that we are not wholly responsible for the way we are, 
since a constitutive part of it is owned to chance. (Sandel 2007, 87.) Although parents 
can have a great influence on their children, even the most honorable parents cannot be 
held wholly responsible for the way their progeny is, if the children’s genome is the 
outcome of chance (Sandel 2007, 45). 
Sandel already notices the increased responsibility in the present society11 in the moral 
burdens that appear in prenatal testing. Prior to easily performed prenatal testing, 
delivering a child with Down’s syndrome was perceived as a matter of chance. However, 
with the new prenatal monitoring technologies, the element of choice has started to 
override the realm of chance. Many parents, who have children with genetic disabilities, 
are feeling judged or blamed, since they could have prevented the birth of a sick child. 
As  Sandel  declares,  even  if  parents  can  choose  whether  or  not  to  use  prenatal  testing,  
and whether or not the outcome of the test will inflict any action, they cannot escape the 
existence of the choice itself and the moral responsibility emerged with the new habits 
of control. Sandel prefigures that when prenatal technologies become even more 
standard procedures for pregnancies, parents who decline to use genetic screening will 
be considered to be “flying blind” and will be held responsible for their children’s 
genetic disorders. (Sandel 2007, 88?9.)  
In construing the definition for social solidarity, Sandel gives the outline of the 
relationship between responsibility and luck. Sandel does not deliver an explicit 
description for this relation, but the strong relation that people can be held responsible 
for the affairs they can impact, can be derived from the paragraphs on social solidarity.  
According  to  Sandel,  social  solidarity  derives  from  a  sense  of  owing.  Sandel  assesses  
that due to the powerful influence of chance in the genetic lottery, we cannot consider 
ourselves  to  deserve  all  the  profit  from our  natural  talents,  which  are  the  outcomes  of  
good luck instead of our own doing. As our talents are more coincidences or gifts than 
deserved achievements, we cannot consider ourselves to be entitled to the unmitigated 
bounty merited in the market economy. In the opposite, Sandel construes, we have an 
                                               
11  It is noteworthy that the society Sandel is considering is the United States.  
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obligation to distribute this benefit with those who, through no fault of their own, lack 
comparable gifts. Thus, the relationship between solidarity and the sense of giftedness is 
a close one. (Sandel 2007, 91.)  As Sandel suggests,    
A lively sense of the contingency of our gifts – an awareness that none of 
us is wholly responsible for his or her success – saves a meritocratic 
society from sliding into the smug assumption that success is the crown of 
virtue, that the rich are rich because they are more deserving than the poor. 
(Sandel 2007, 91.)  
Sandel predicts that hyperagency and the considerable increase in responsibility will 
result in a decrease in social solidarity. He designates this as the loss of wanting to 
share our fate with others. (Sandel 2007, 89.) If our genetic composition was mastered, 
the  sense  of  owing  to  those  less  advantaged  would  weaken  as  they  could  be  held  
responsible for their own position, if they did not choose genetic enhancements:  
If genetic engineering enabled us to override the results of the genetic 
lottery, to replace chance with choice, the gifted character of human 
powers and achievements would recede, and with it, perhaps, our capacity 
to see ourselves as sharing a common fate. The successful would become 
even more likely than they are now to view themselves as self-made and 
self-sufficient, and hence wholly responsible for their success. Those at 
the bottom of society would be viewed not as disadvantaged, and so 
worthy of a measure of compensation, but as simply unfit, and so worthy 
of eugenic repair. The meritocracy, less chastened by chance, would 
become harder, less forgiving. As perfect genetic knowledge would end 
the simulacrum of solidarity in insurance markets, perfect genetic control 
would erode the actual solidarity that arises when men and women reflect 
on the contingency of their talents and fortunes. (Sandel 2007, 91?2.) 
Sandel reinforces the concept of diminishing solidarity by comparing it to the 
solidaristic aspect in insurance. Unaware of the various diseases or misfortunes people 
might encounter, they pool their risk by buying health and life insurances. The outcome 
is non-intentional mutuality, as the healthy will subsidize the unhealthy. However, this 
mutuality will be achieved only if people are uninformed of their risk factors and cannot 
control them. If people could reliably predict their medical history, those confident with 
good health would opt out of the pool and cause hard price increases to those 
determined to sickness. In Sandel’s terms, those with good genes would flee the 
actuarial company, leaving those with bad genes behind, and the solidaristic aspect of 
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insurance would disappear.12  Similarly, in the wider society, Sandel speculates, the 
ability to choose genetic enhancements and master one’s life would weaken the moral 
sentiments necessary to social solidarity. (Sandel 2007, 89?92.) 
Hence,  Sandel  posits  a  powerful  relationship  between  responsibility  and  the  ability  to  
choose. Sandel predicts that individuals could be held responsible for their traits or the 
lack of them, because with genetic enhancements it could be possible to make actual 
decisions about one’s genotype. Thus, people would be held responsible for the 
outcomes of their decisions concerning their or their children’s genome, because they 
would be able to control the outcome. In contrast, if no such choices exist, the effect of 
the genetic lottery prevails, and people cannot be held responsible for their traits. This 
principle of responsibility can be connected to the theories of responsibility-sensitive 
egalitarianism, and the connection between these theories and Sandel’s argument will be 
analyzed in detail in chapter 3.  
When examining Sandel’s claims on adopting hyperagency and losing the sense of 
solidarity, it is noteworthy that their logical relation is not evident. Sandel’s 
argumentative chain seems to be divided into two sections: firstly, the assertion of the 
importance of preserving the sense of giftedness and avoiding hyperagency, and 
secondly, the prediction of the loss of important social values, such as solidarity. But is 
the loss of solidarity only a consequence of hyperagency, and do they have some causal 
relation13? For if it is so, the loss of solidarity would be reduced to a mere outcome, 
deflating the power of Sandel’s argument that is indicated for demonstrating the moral 
issues of enhancements as such, not only those of their consequences.  
However, a more plausible way of interpretation that takes into account Sandel’s 
position as a neo-Aristotelian virtue ethicist14 is that the relation between the sense of 
giftedness and solidarity is intrinsic rather than causal. Sandel’s central conceptions can 
be organized in clusters that belong to a same kind of virtue. Humility, considering 
                                               
12  Even though Sandel’s comparison is somewhat illustrating, it is noteworthy that the issue with 
insurance policies is more complicated than Sandel outlines. For example, the problem of vanishing 
solidarity in insurance is not limited to genetic knowledge: much of a person’s medical history is already 
predictable with the medical history of the family. Thus, people already are aware of many of their risk 
factors and, in addition, can have an influence on many of these factors. The literature about genetic 
knowledge and insurance is extensive; for example Eli Feiring discusses widely the issues of insurance, 
genetic responsibility and justice (Feiring 2009, 300?310).   
13 For example, Kamm questions the validity of Sandel’s argument in adjudging it as mere 
consequentialism. She challenges the causal relation by claiming that adopting the sense of hyperagency 
will not necessarily lead to the undesirable implications Sandel predicts. (Kamm 2005, 5?9.) 
14 Häyry gives this category to Sandel (Häyry 2010, 27).  
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talents and traits as gifts rather than fully one’s own achievements, openness to 
unbidden, the sense of solidarity and humane responsibility are of the same virtue, as 
they  cultivate  the  society  in  a  desirable  way.  On  the  other  hand,  hubris,  the  sense  of  
mastery, hyperagency, considering one’s talents and traits in the domain of choices and 
personal accomplishments, the loss of solidarity and bursting responsibility represent 
the same vice, pursuing for perfection and remodeling human nature. The concepts in 
the same family of virtue or vice are intrinsic to each other and not one another’s 
consequences. The manipulation of the genome becomes a virtue or a vice only after an 
attribute of a certain habit of mind and a way of being is attached to it, as in the 
distinction of the Aristotelian concepts of praksis and poiesis. 15  If the genome is 
manipulated with a hubristic habit of mind it is a vice, but if technologies are used with 
humility, the practice is virtuous.  
1.3. Challenging Sandel’s argument about the loss of solidarity 
Sandel’s critics comment the argument about the vanishing solidarity from two 
perspectives. Firstly, the strong relation between responsibility and choice that Sandel 
assumes is debated. The more weight posited on that relation, the more plausible the 
alterations in our moral landscape are supposed to be. In spite of the varying 
assumptions  that  the  different  authors  have  about  this  relation,  most  of  them  suggest  
that genetic enhancements should be introduced.    
Secondly, it is argued that with genetic enhancements, the society would become more 
equal and the meaning of solidarity in the society would diminish. While Sandel argues 
that the sense of solidarity is required in order to motivate people for maintaining 
redistributive institutions, his critics claim that if natural assets were introduced in 
distributive schemes, there would be less bad luck to compensate for, and solidarity 
would not be needed that much anymore. The plausibility of the latter scenario depends 
on the level of confidence put in the abilities of genetic enhancement to increase the 
overall equality and well-being in the society.  
 
                                               
15 The difference between praksis and poiesis is that in praksis, the activity and the end are intrinsic, but 
in poiesis, the end is separate from the activity. (NE 1139a30–1139b5, 1140a1–24). Likewise, mere 
genetic manipulation is only poiesis by its nature, while genetic manipulation with a certain attitude and 
end has the nature of praksis. 
20 
 
1.3.1. The relation between responsibility and choice  
Various understandings about the relation between responsibility and choice induce 
different predictions about the effect that genetic enhancements could have in existing 
morality. If a strong relation is assumed to exist and the possibility to control one’s 
genome increased remarkably, changes in conceptions of responsibility and other moral 
values are expected. For example, Ronald Dworkin holds this position. In addition, Ori 
Lev believes in a strong relation, but adduces more requirements for the changes to take 
place.  In  contrast,  Kamm  does  not  believe  that  responsibility  and  choice  would  have  
such a strong relation, and therefore, she doubts that genetic enhancements would have 
any of the predicted consequences on moral and social values.  
Dworkin emphasizes the normative significance of the contingency in the genetic 
lottery  that  sets  the  limit  between  the  matters  in  our  lives  that  can  be  altered  by  our  
choices, and circumstances that cannot be influenced. For Dworkin, this limit is the 
backbone of our morality, and it defines the boundaries of individual responsibility. He 
argues that we can be held responsible only for the matters we can influence and not for 
other  matters,  and  that  there  is  greater  responsibility  to  compensate  for  the  victims  of  
such circumstances they themselves cannot affect. Dworkin argues that, at the moment, 
the measure of our responsibility is our genetic constitution, and one cannot be blamed 
for the way he was born. This precondition could be changed with genetic engineering. 
(Dworkin 2000, 443?6.) Also Lev states, referring to Dworkin, that personal 
responsibility  has  a  central  role  in  the  (Western)  political  systems  and  that  societal  
institutions actually depend on the possibility of assigning personal responsibility for 
freely made choices. Therefore, it is of great importance to consider the effects that 
genetic enhancement would have on the conception of responsibility. (Lev 2009, 180.)  
Dworkin believes that any changes in this backbone will result in moral instability, 
especially in the domain of individual responsibility. He underlines that if the 
possibilities  in  the  field  of  genetics  were  taken  seriously,  the  breakdown of  our  moral  
and  ethical  code  could  start  almost  at  any  moment.  In  spite  of  these  possible  changes,  
Dworkin sees no reason to resist genetic enhancements. In the opposite, he argues that 
enhancing the lives of the future generations is the only morally and ethically 
responsible act to do, and our moral norms should be adjusted to the new situation. 
Dworkin’s rights-based justification for his conclusion derive from his ethical 
individualism,  which  holds  that  it  is  objectively,  from  the  society’s  point  of  view,  
important that any human life succeed rather than fail, and that the individual has the 
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right to make decisions that define what successful life is for him. 16 According to 
Dworkin,  these  principles  command  that  it  is  our  duty  and  responsibility  to  make  the  
lives of future generations longer and more full of talent and achievement. (Dworkin 
2000, 445?6, 452.) Thus, Dworkin seems to hold that it is the individual’s right to 
choose to use enhancements, and that it is the society’s duty to promote enhancement-
technologies so that individuals are able to choose the most successful lives.  
Harris  concurs  that,  in  spite  of  the  alteration  in  our  moral  landscape,  we  must  employ  
enhancements for being able to create a better human nature. According to Harris, we 
are responsible for using our abilities in genetic engineering because we are able to do 
so17 . In contrast to Dworkin, Harris arrives to his conclusion with consequentialist 
reasoning: with enhancement technologies it is, in general, possible to achieve more 
well-being and less suffering. The significant issue to Harris is overall well-being, and 
he states that fairness does not require that benefits should not be provided to any until 
they can be made available to all. (Harris 2007, 28?9; 117?122.) 
Albeit agreeing with Dworkin about the significant relation between choice, luck and 
responsibility, Lev is more cautious about the inevitable nature of the change in our 
moral landscape. Moreover, unlike Dworkin and Harris, he emphasizes the importance 
of preserving the existing values of solidarity and a humane conception of responsibility. 
With the motivation to demarcate the circumstances harmful to the maintainable values, 
Lev  outlines  a  proposal  for  the  conditions  that  would  lead  to  such  corruption  of  
solidarity that Sandel predicts. (Lev 2009, 177?9.) 
                                               
16As a solution to a new ethical framework of the altered moral landscape, Dworkin offers a theory that is 
founded on the above-mentioned principles of ethical individualism. Dworkin defines his theory as liberal 
(freedom to define good life for oneself) and egalitarian (people are of equal importance and social 
institutions follow this egalitarian principle), and it distributes risks and benefits while recognizing the 
responsibility people bear by their choices, but not the effects of brute luck, including the genetic lottery. 
(Dworkin 2000, 448?9.) However, it seems that Dworkin’s solution is the same theory that he has 
suggested also elsewhere (see Chapter 3), thus, it remains open whether or not Dworkin’s solution would 
have any contribution in a situation in which the genetic lottery could actually be controlled.   
17 The line of argument about the necessity to use all existing technology, given by Harris and Dworkin, 
has been challenged by Andrew Edgar. Edgar contrasts this enthusiastic attitude to genetic technologies 
with Adorno’s and Horkheimer’s main thesis in Dialectic of Enlightenment (2002): the Enlightenment 
project, aimed to reveal and oppose dogmatic suspicions, has itself become a dogma as technological 
development has become an end rather than a means, thus, a dogma in itself. Therefore, the 
Enlightenment project, using critical reflection for various dogmatic believes, lost its own ability for self-
critical reflection. In this spirit, Edgar suggests that the scholars of enthusiastic attitude to genetic 
technology have lost their ability to critical reflection of their goals and have positioned the use of new 
technologies as an unquestioned truth. (Edgar 2009, 159–160.) Jürgen Habermas explicates this tendency 
by disclosing that because the development of science and technology are most often related to the 
improvement of economy and the increase in individual choices, science has long had a strong alliance 
with the spirit of liberalism, and restrictive policies to science are rarely accepted (Habermas 2003, 24?6). 
Thus, the political atmosphere advocates liberal approaches to science. 
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Lev’s proposal is  based on the fact  that  for Sandel,  the social  premise for solidarity is  
the recognition of the effect of contingency in one’s life, and thus, solidarity would be 
undermined if this contingency would vanish. Therefore, Lev focuses on outlining the 
circumstances in which luck and other arbitrary issues would not influence the use of 
enhancements.  
First, Lev suggests that enhancements should be administered only to adults. This is 
because only adults are autonomous in the sense that they can make informed consent 
decisions. If enhancements had an effect only on embryos or children, luck would still 
have a central role in one’s genetic constitution, as the decisions would not be made by 
the enhanced individual, but by parents. Secondly, enhancements should be universally 
available. Without universal access, luck and arbitrariness would still have a major role 
in determining the ones who would be able to the access the enhancements. Thus, 
everyone would not be able to make genuine choices concerning the use of 
enhancements, if wealth or accessible enhancements were limiting facts. Finally, Lev 
suggests that enhancements should be safely and equally effectively provided to any 
adult. If the influence of enhancements varied individually and produced unwanted 
outcomes or side-effects for some, it would still depend on chance which people would 
be suitable for enhancements.  (Lev 2009, 178?9.) 
Lev concludes that only under these conditions, luck and other arbitrary issues would 
not have an effect the use of enhancements, and it could be concluded that talent or the 
lack of it would not depend on luck anymore but on choice. Consequently, solidarity, 
defined as the recognition of the arbitrariness of one’s talent or the lack of them, would 
be undermined. (Lev 2009, 177?9.) It could be furthermore added to Lev’s 
requirements that the achieved control by genetic enhancements should be fundamental, 
inducing permanent changes in people’s overall lives. For if not, in spite of the 
enhancement of some genetic traits, the effect of a person’s socioeconomic position in 
the start of his life would still have a major contribution. Genetic manipulation would 
not affect the family to which one is born: the parents’ education, living area and other 
social  capital.  People  would  still  share  the  fate  of  the  contingency  of  social  
contingencies and therefore, the sense of solidarity would still be present.  
The conditions outlined by Lev lead to an interesting conclusion. If Lev’s proposal is 
true,  it  turns  Sandel’s  argument  into  a  difficult  paradox:  solidarity  could  be  preserved  
only by keeping enhancements only as a privilege of the wealthy, by restricting 
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enhancements for adults, and by assuring that enhancements would not be suitable for 
all.  Thus,  if  we  wanted  to  eschew  the  circumstances  that  could  lead  to  diminishing  
solidarity, we would be forced to avoid the combination of universally available 
enhancements that are effective and safe to all people. But are these requirements not 
the only proper manner for introducing enhancements, for if not, would at least the 
value of equality, which is certainly related to solidarity, be undermined?  
Lev  himself  adduces  that  solidarity  could  also  be  affected  by  administering  the  
significant enhancements only for those who can afford them, because the gap between 
those well-off and those worst-off would become so large that the wealthy would lose 
their ability to empathize with the indigent, thus creating two classes of people (Lev 
2009, 179). It seems that Lev’s analysis leads to either the conclusion that Sandel’s 
argument is a logical fallacy, in which both the absence and presence of the solidarity-
preserving elements lead to diminished solidarity, or to the affirmation for Sandel’s 
benefit that through whatever means enhancements will be administered, they will 
necessarily lead to the corruption of important social values.  
Unlike the ones who believe in a strong relation between responsibility and choice, 
Kamm thinks that genetic enhancements will have no significant changes in our moral 
landscape. She contradicts the normative weight that Sandel places on the relation of 
making choices and being responsible for them, and doubts the idea that people would 
be blamed if they failed to give themselves or others the most desirable characteristics. 
For Kamm, the more plausible motivation for the duty to aid others derives from the 
respect  and  concern  for  the  value  of  other  persons  rather  than  from  the  degree  of  
responsibility they bear in their situations. Kamm emphasizes that since there is no duty 
to make oneself the best possible, one cannot be held responsible for not doing all that is 
possible in order to achieve perfection18. She adds that, at any rate, children could not be 
held responsible for their parents’ decisions. (Kamm 2005, 12?3.)  
Interestingly, also Sandel notices that genetically enhanced children would certainly not 
be held responsible for their traits, but they would remain indebted for their 
characteristics (Sandel 2007, 87). But how will the parents bear the burden of 
                                               
18 According to Lev, Sandel’s prognosis on the enormously increasing burden of responsibility will only 
take place if an obligation to enhance exists. Without an obligation to use enhancements, failing to do so 
should have little moral consequences, and the burden of responsibility would be immutable. What Lev 
considers a bigger problem is that people would most likely behave as there was an obligation to enhance, 
and hold each other responsible for the outcomes that could be avoided with enhancements. This 
misapprehension of responsibility is the real problem. At least in legal sphere, these misunderstandings 
could be avoided, but it is more difficult in the actual society. (Lev 2009, 180.)  
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responsibility, if this burden ought not to apply to the child who through no fault of his 
own carries a particular genome? It is evident that almost any burden, be it economical, 
moral or both, will also affect the child in some negative way.  
As can be discovered, there is no agreement on the certainty of the upcoming changes in 
our moral landscape. Predictions depend on the different philosophical conceptions of 
responsibility and speculations about empirical scenarios. Philosophically, the most 
remarkable feature in the question of preserving solidarity is the relation between 
responsibility and chance in the ability to control one’s genome.  
1.3.2. Enhancements as a means for improving equality 
A shared view within many of the proponents of genetic enhancements is that 
enhancements would introduce new means for redistribution and decrease the need for it. 
This feature is related to the maintenance and elevation of solidarity. Harris argues that 
the more enhancements will be performed, the less there will be bad luck to compensate 
for (Harris 2007, 120). Kamm notes that in addition to redistributing wealth, also 
natural assets could be distributed, leading to better opportunities for being more 
productive (Kamm 2005, 13). Both conclude that even if the sense of solidarity 
decreased, the outcome with genetic enhancements would be better. They seem to 
predict that less solidarity would be needed as the gap between the wealthy and the less 
wealthy would decrease due to enhancements. But would enhancements actually 
remove the need for solidarity by leveling the playing field more equally among all 
socioeconomic groups? 
Dworkin admits that it would not be possible to make the new techniques available for 
everyone, at least not in the beginning. If a community tried to deliver enhancements for 
everyone and spent all its resources on health care, there would not be left any means 
for other societal necessities such as education and culture, and citizens would only be 
enabled to live somewhat longer in misery. However, he concludes that the wealthy 
should still be allowed to purchase expensive therapies at the market rate, because 
demand stimulates research and, in time, creates benefits that have value for everyone. 
(Dworkin 2000, 436?440.) G.K.D. Crozier and Christopher Hajzler term this process as 
the market stimulus effect, i.e. the outcome of a set of mechanisms whereby the early 
adoption of a new technology by wealthy consumers promote better and cheaper 
versions of that product, thus leading to more availability to those less wealthy. 
However, they question whether this effect would be powerful enough for vindicating 
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the free-marketing of this new technology of genetic enhancements. (Crozier and 
Hajzler 2010, 161.) 
Crozier and Hajzler argue that the market stimulus effect could remain insufficient for 
preventing the widening gap between rich and poor. They point out that even a small 
widening  might  be  detrimental  to  the  health  and  the  overall  well-being  of  the  less  
wealthy.19 Thus, even though everyone’s living standards would increase after genetic 
enhancements, the widening or remaining width of the gap is a sufficient threat to the 
health of the poor for questioning the benefits of the market stimulus effect. In addition, 
it  could  be  that  the  benefits  of  the  market  stimulus  effect  would  never  reach  the  poor,  
but only the middle-class, remaining largely irrelevant to those worst-off. The market 
stimulus effect would probably not be powerful enough, because genetic enhancements 
will most likely remain of specialized nature, requiring highly trained professionals. 
Thus,  it  is  unlikely  that  the  market  stimulus  effect  would  decrease  the  prices  of  
enhancements  in  the  same  way  as,  for  example,  cellular  phones.  (Crozier  and  Hajzler  
2010, 170?2.)  
Crozier and Hajzler point out that if the aim is to achieve more equality and well-being 
in the society by leveling up the worst-off, genomic interventions will not be the most 
effective means. They state that better nutrition, education and overall development 
with rising standards of living will certainly be more cost-effective methods for 
improving  the  overall  mental  capabilities  and  competitiveness  of  a  society,  than  
technological innovations. (Crozier and Hajzler 2010, 172.) Thus, why not effectuate 
the objective of more equality and well-being immediately with existing means? Why 
should genetic enhancement be the answer for improving societal well-being and 
equality when much more plausible means are available?  
A further issue to contemplate is that is the idea of introducing genetic enhancements to 
redistributive schemes compatible with the notion of genetic enhancements as 
individually made genetic decisions in the private market. The liberal eugenic principle 
is that genetic enhancement must be non-coercive, freely chosen and the state must be 
neutral towards these choices. However, if enhancement was a means for redistribution, 
would this not implicate some government-oriented standards? If the state compensated 
for the lack of some traits, a compensation policy should surely exist. Thus, the 
                                               
19 Crozier and Hajzler refer to Richard Wilkinson’s and Kate Pickett’s enquiry when describing how 
social inequalities are harmful to health; they are linked e.g. to prevalence of social problems and lower 
life expectancy (Crozier and Hajzler 2010, 170 [Wilkinson and Pickett 2009, 31?45]).  
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decisions about genetic enhancement would not after all belong entirely to the 
individual’s domain of choice.  
For example, Allen Buchanan et al. note that certain all-purpose enhancements are 
useful in any plan of life, and could be encouraged by the state. Just as parents are 
required to assure health and education for their children, they could be claimed to give 
these certain enhancements to their progeny. (Buchanan et al 2001, 174.) Furthermore, 
Dworkin and Julian Savulescu both claim that enhancing evolution and selecting the 
best possible life for one’s child could be morally required (Dworkin 2000, 452; 
Savulescu 2001, 413?425). As Sandel notes, liberal eugenics has more compulsion than 
what first appears and does not after all reject all state-imposed genetics (Sandel 2007, 
78?9).  
Elizabeth Anderson adds that it would be offending to connect redistributive schemes to 
a state-originated level of normality. If people were divided to unfit and fit, and to 
compensable and non-compensable, the ones who remained under that limit would be 
stigmatized. Anderson contemplates the ways in which the state could announce to a 
person in a non-offensive way that his IQ was below a certain level and that he would 
be entitled to compensations for that. Anderson argues that these kinds of redistributive 
principles would not increase genuine equality in a society, at least not in the meaning 
of assuring equal respect for every citizen.20 (Anderson 1999, 305?6.)  
The difficulty in the debate is that whether or not the enhancements would have positive 
or negative outcomes in the notions of responsibility and solidarity is an empirical 
question for which we lack data (Lev 2009, 181). Therefore, none of the positions in the 
enhancement debate can be either proved or falsified. The philosophically interesting 
domain is in the analysis of the premises given in the debate. After introducing the 
different standpoints related to Sandel’s argument about the diminishing solidarity and 
the increasing burden of responsibility, I will now focus on exploring the philosophical 
premises of these arguments. 
                                               
20 Anderson does not consider issues in genetic enhancement and the distribution of natural assets, but 
focuses on societal compensations. However, her comments about the effects that a state-centered norm 
of normal level of certain characteristics could have are applicable also in the context of distributing 
natural assets.  
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2. Sandel and the philosophy of the common good 
After introducing the different standpoints related to Sandel’s argument about the 
diminishing solidarity and the increasing burden of responsibility, I will now focus on 
exploring the philosophical premises of these arguments. 
The main difference between Sandel and the ones holding a more permissive approach 
to genetic enhancements is that for Sandel, the most important thing is to preserve the 
social  values  of  humility  and  solidarity,  regardless  of  the  possible  advantages  and  
opportunities that enhancements could introduce. In contrast, the proponents of genetic 
enhancements argue that even though they affected changes in our moral landscape, the 
new  genetic  technology  should  still  be  introduced.  It  is  claimed  that  genetic  
enhancements would produce more well-being and equality in the society and that the 
improvement of humanity is even morally required. Typically to the liberal eugenicist 
argumentation, also individual rights are emphasized: why should one not have the right 
to choose genetic enhancements if he wanted so?  
Hence, the question is that on what grounds Sandel defends his position, neglecting 
individual rights and the overall benefit? What philosophical premises does he have in 
saying that preserving solidarity is more important than the individual freedom of 
choice or the possible benefit for humanity?  
The answer lies in that Sandel’s philosophical starting point is in the communitarian 
tradition, whereas approaches emphasizing the overall benefit and individual rights 
draw from consequentialist  and  deontological  theories.  As  Häyry  states,  in  contrast  to  
consequentialist outcome- and utility-directed ethics and deontological rule- and duty-
based ethics, Sandel can be associated with teleological purpose- and virtue-oriented 
ethics. Häyry places Sandel under the notion neo-Aristotelian for Sandel draws from 
Aristotle’s thinking but adds two millennia of philosophy in it.  (Häyry 2010, 27.)  
Häyry explicates further the differences of these three normative doctrines of the 
Western moral philosophy in the bioethical context and decision-making. The 
proponents of consequentialist approaches emphasize measuring i.e. minimizing harms 
and maximizing benefits, while the proponents of deontological approaches highlight 
negotiating by following certain procedures and principles in decision making. In 
contrast, the teleological approach concentrates on sensing. This approach holds a closer 
relation between values and norms, and considers community traditions and ways of life 
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more significant than consequences and principles. As Häyry marks, this moral 
transcendence approach is less calculating and less individualistic than the other 
doctrines.  (Häyry 2010, 228?9, 232.)  
In  this  chapter,  I  will  present  the  premises  on  which  Sandel  grounds  the  priority  of  
preserving  certain  social  values,  such  as  humility  and  solidarity.  I  will  start  the  
investigation of Sandel’s philosophical premises by introducing the critique Sandel 
poses to Rawlsian liberalism, because Sandel is arguably best understood by exploring 
this critique. Then, I will proceed by analyzing Sandel’s own views: Sandel’s 
teleological starting points emphasizing good life and communal values and the position 
that solidarity has within them, and the politics of the common good that Sandel aims to 
justify.  Exploring  these  premises  create  a  basis  for  understanding  the  reasons  why  
Sandel gives such weight for the maintenance of solidarity. This understanding will be 
essential for the analysis in chapters 3 and 4 on Sandel’s conceptions of chance, choice 
and responsibility.  
2.1. Balancing between the right and the good  
The leading thread in Sandel’s philosophical work is in criticizing the prevailing 
political culture in the United States: the rights-based framework that aims for the 
state’s neutrality on conceptions of the good. This critique derives from Sandel’s most 
influential philosophical work Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (1982), in which he 
criticizes what he names deontological liberalism: the liberalism that John Rawls 
outlined in his A Theory of Justice (1971). Sandel is most commonly known as a critic 
of Rawls and presents the foundations of his own philosophical views in contrast to him. 
Therefore, I will start my examination of Sandel’s philosophy from this critique21.  
2.1.1. The critique of the primacy of rights 
The liberalism that Sandel criticizes is, by his own definition, deontological liberalism: 
a theory of the primacy of justice among moral and political ideals. Sandel states that its 
central  thesis is  that  the best  way to arrange a society with a plurality of persons,  who 
all have their own ends and desires, is to govern it by principles that do not themselves 
presuppose any particular conception of the good. (Sandel 1998, 1.) 
                                               
21 It is noteworthy that I will focus on presenting Sandel’s philosophical premises that can be derived 
from his critique, and not review Sandel’s critique of Rawlsian liberalism at length and analyze its 
validity.  
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Deontological liberalism has its roots in Kantian liberalism, emphasizing the autonomy, 
rationality and individuality of a person. Formulating this idea more suitably for the 
present, Rawls refined it in his theory of justice as fairness, where the two principles of 
justice22 governing the society are found in the original position, an ideal hypothetical 
situation behind the veil of ignorance, where rational people deliberate about justice 
without any knowledge of their particular positions in the society. Thus, the principles 
of justice are impartial, founded by an overlapping consensus, and independently 
derived; therefore, they do not depend on any particular conceptions of the good, which 
would depend on contingent desires of persons. The conception of justice defined in this 
way is always to be the first virtue in social institutions. (Rawls 1999a, 1–20, 118–130, 
395; Sandel 1998, 1–7.)  
According  to  Sandel,  the  priority  of  the  right  over  the  good  is  not  well-grounded,  
because this priority misses the relation between the self and the community, and 
between justice and the good. Sandel asks that if justice is more than just another value 
because it is derived independently from any conceptions of the good, what is the basis 
of justice and rights? (Sandel 1998, 6?7.) 
The first issue in Sandel’s critique is the self-image that, in his view, deontological 
liberalism requires. According to Sandel, this required conception of a person is 
voluntaristic, entailing that a person’s values and ends are always attributes and never 
constituents of the self. Subjects are assumed to be unencumbered of any commitments 
outside the subject and free of communal ties regarding the values and conceptions of 
the good. Sandel draws this requirement especially from the original position, where the 
hypothetical deliberators are supposed to choose the principles of justice without any 
knowledge of their background. Sandel maintains that, within the liberal conception, the 
most essential issues in our personality are not the ends we choose but the capacity to 
choose them. Just as the right is assumed to be prior to the good, the subject is prior to 
its objects and its ends. The self is what the subject is and its objects are only what the 
subject has. (Sandel 1998, 7?9, 15?22.) 
Sandel asserts that this liberalistic self-image is flawed because the subject cannot be 
detached from what it has. The self is attached to the community, and being a person to 
                                               
22 Rawls’ final statement on the principles of justice is, in lexical order: 1.Each person is to have an equal 
right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty 
for all. 2. Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) to the greatest 
benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just savings principle, and (b) attached to offices and 
positions open to all under conditions and fair equality of opportunity (Rawls 1999a, 266). 
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whom justice is primary requires us to be creatures of a certain kind, related to human 
circumstances in a certain way. (Sandel 1998, 49.) According to Sandel, to imagine a 
person without constitutive attachments to a family, nation or community is not to 
conceive an ideally free and rational agent, but to imagine a person wholly without 
character and moral depth. Sandel emphasizes that humans need a history in order to 
have a character and a narrative on which to build plans of life. Furthermore, political 
deliberation is not only about various policies and principles but also about competing 
interpretations of the character and ends of the community. Thus, moral attachments 
from communal ties cannot be renounced. 23 (Sandel 1998, 179; Sandel 1996, 350?1.)  
Hence, Sandel asserts that justice cannot be primary in the deontological sense because 
we cannot coherently regard ourselves as the kinds of beings the deontological ethics 
requires us to be. Accordingly, impartial deliberation on the principles of justice is 
impossible, because the existence of impartial deliberators is impossible24. (Sandel 1998, 
14.) According to Sandel, the community does not describe only what individuals have, 
but also what they are. The community is not a mere attribute, but a constituent of the 
self.  (Sandel 1998, 150.)  
The conception of a person that Sandel presents in his critique of the primacy of rights 
is an important and constitutive part of his political philosophy, and the community’s 
foundational character of the self is present throughout his argumentation. The emphasis 
on  the  community  also  links  Sandel  to  the  familiar  communitarian  doctrine  about  the  
primacy of the community over the individual.  
The second issue in Sandel’s critique of the primacy of justice is the assertion that 
justice and rights are independent of any particular conception of the good life. He 
emphasizes that justice cannot be detached from the considerations of the good, and 
                                               
23 According to Thomas Pogge, Rawls actually claims no such absolute priorities of the self being prior to 
its ends, of the right prior to the good, of justice over other values, and the principles of justice over the 
choice of conceptions of the good. Pogge specifies that Rawls is not making such claims concerning 
citizens in their personal affairs and accuses Sandel of undermining this distinction between the political 
and personal contexts. (Pogge 87–91.) Especially in his later work, Rawls does make the difference 
between the public identity of a person who is to consider the rights over the goods and the nonpublic 
identity of persons that are to have more loyalties and commitments to their community than the rational, 
justice-oriented, impartial individual behind the veil of ignorance. (Rawls 2005, 29–35.) Thus, although 
Rawls’ original position has certain practical difficulties and questionable premises, it can be suggested 
that Sandel overplays these issues.  
24  Sandel also links this spurious voluntarism to the frustration in the [American] society that has 
absorbed the liberal self-image that is, however, at odds with the actual organization of modern social and 
economic life. “Even as we think and act as freely choosing, independent selves, we confront a world 
governed by impersonal structures of power that defy our understanding and control. The voluntaristic 
conception of freedom leaves us ill equipped to contend with this condition.” (Sandel 2005, 28–29; 
Sandel 1996, 201–203.)  
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reflections about justice are always also reflections about the good. Sandel states that as 
a philosophical matter, reflections about justice cannot reasonably be detached from 
reflections  about  the  nature  of  the  good  life  and  the  highest  human  ends,  and  as  a  
political matter, deliberations about justice and rights cannot proceed without reference 
to the conceptions of the good. (Sandel 2005, 213.)  
Sandel  grounds  his  claim  on  the  relation  between  justice  and  the  conceptions  of  the  
good on the teleological tradition and Aristotle. Aristotle maintains that the 
establishment of the best possible constitution of a society requires that a definition of 
the most desirable life be decided first (Politics, 1323a14). Following this teleological 
notion,  Sandel  asserts  that  the  principles  of  justice  necessarily  depend  on  their  
justification of the moral worth or the intrinsic good of the ends they serve. The 
recognition of a right depends on showing that it honors or advances some important 
human good. (Sandel 1998, xi.) In considering, for example, the rights to free speech 
and religious liberty, Sandel emphasizes that it is not the respect of people’s capacity to 
choose their beliefs and opinions that matter and validate these rights. What really 
matters are the especially worthy practices and activities that these rights protect. 
(Sandel 1996, 291.)  
Thus, Sandel states that our moral convictions and best understanding in conceptions of 
the good life and the highest human ends should not be set aside when considering the 
principles of justice that govern the basic structure of the society (Sandel 2005, 219). 
Deontological liberalism insists on a neutral framework of rights because given 
conceptions of the good would undermine the independent self and its capability of 
choosing  its  own ends,  but  Sandel  claims  that  it  is  not  always  even  possible  to  define  
rights and duties without taking up substantive moral questions (Sandel 1998, 1?9; 
Sandel 2009, 220).   
Sandel takes the abortion debate as an example that cannot be solved without taking a 
stand on an underlying moral and religious controversy. The anti-abortion side claims 
that abortion should be banned because it involves the taking of an innocent human life, 
and the pro-choice side claims that, since the law should not take sides concerning the 
moral and theological debate about the beginning of the life, women should be allowed 
to decide for themselves whether or not to have an abortion. However, Sandel argues, 
the liberal argument does not succeed because if the developing fetus actually would be 
morally equivalent to a child, abortion would be morally equivalent to infanticide, 
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which the government would hardly wish to legalize. So, the liberal argument implicitly 
rests on the assumption that the Catholic Church teaching on the moral status of the 
fetus  is  false,  and  so  the  liberal  argument  fails  to  be  neutral  on  the  underlying  moral  
question. Sandel suggests that the liberal argument should concentrate on showing that 
the developing fetus really is not a person, which Sandel believes is certainly possible. 
Sandel concludes that the more confident we are that fetuses are different from babies, 
the more confident the government can be in leaving the moral question aside. (Sandel 
2009, 251–2; 2005, 225–6.)   
In addition, Sandel claims that Rawls’ principles of justice are themselves dependent on 
a certain conception of the good. Sandel argues that the difference principle, i.e. social 
and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both to the greatest benefit 
of the least advantaged, is not neutral, and an adequate defense of it must presuppose a 
conception of the person unavailable to deontological assumptions. Sandel asserts that 
we cannot, at the same time, be subjects for whom justice is primary and be subjects for 
whom the difference principle is a principle of justice. (Sandel 1998, 66.)  
As Sandel explicates, the difference principle states that since one’s assets are only his 
by  accident,  he  does  not  deserve  them,  and  the  society  has  a  claim  for  the  profit  
resulting  from  these  assets.  However,  Sandel  claims  that  for  this  to  be  true,  one  must  
count himself as a member of a community defined in part by its ends so that the 
elements of solidarity and fraternity in the difference principle will appear reasonable. 
But  in  this  case,  one  ceases  to  be  unencumbered  by  constitutive  attachments.  (Sandel  
1998, 178.) Chantal Mouffe accurately encapsulates Sandel’s central thesis about the 
contradiction  in  Rawls’  theory  about  self-image  and  the  priority  of  the  right.  Mouffe  
explicates that the unencumbered conception of the subject, incapable of constitutive 
engagements, is at the same time necessary for the right to have priority over the good, 
and contradictory to the difference principle, which Rawls intends to justify to be a 
principle of justice (Mouffe 1988, 198). 
Sandel admits that it is tempting to seek a principle that would cover all the areas of the 
distribution of income or power and justify the results. Such a principle would enable us 
to avoid disagreements about the good life. However, it is impossible to avoid these 
disagreements since justice is inevitably judgmental. Whatever we are arguing about, 
questions of justice are always bound up with competing notions of virtue, honor and 
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recognition, and questions about the good. Justice is not only about the right way to 
distribute things. It is also about the right way to value things. (Sandel 2009, 261.)  
Sandel’s critique of the primacy of rights, presented in this section, is essential for 
understanding the first step in his argument of weighting solidarity over the right to 
choose genetic enhancements: this individual right cannot be valued as such, 
independently of reflections on what is good, and without considering the practices and 
conceptions of the good that the right protects. The question to ask is whether the right 
to choose enhancements really advances some human good. After explaining Sandel’s 
justification about not giving primacy to rights, I am going to proceed to considering 
what kind of a good is the good that Sandel wants to protect, and the reasons why he 
gives solidarity such weight.  
2.1.2. Common good and civic virtues 
When Sandel’s argumentation and critique of Rawlsian liberalism is examined, Sandel’s 
philosophical position as an Aristotelian communitarian is visible. Instead of 
emphasizing rights in a deontological manner, he claims using teleological terms that 
both the self and the community, and the right and the good are inseparable.   
Even though Sandel does not construct a full alternative to the Rawlsian theory of 
justice and focuses on showing the limits of deontological liberalism, the fundamental 
elements of his own endorsed political philosophy can be observed in his writings. As 
noted,  the  elements  that  Sandel  emphasizes  in  his  critique  are  the  fundamental  role  of  
the community in the constitution of the self and the relation of justice to the 
conceptions of the good life and the highest human ends. Sandel terms his alternative 
the politics of the common good, which relates justice to the conceptions of the good. In 
this section, I will examine Sandel’s understanding about this common good.        
Sandel’s first philosophical principle is pursuing a good life with the politics of the 
common good. This primary aim of politics is drawn relatively directly from Aristotle’s 
philosophy. According to Aristotle, a state cannot reduce its activity only to the 
prevention of injustice and the provision of a living for its members, because in such 
case, the state is a mere alliance and association of people, who happen to live in the 
same area. Aristotle demands more from a society. He claims that, even though the state 
must certainly assure justice and livelihood, it must also make it possible for its 
members  to  be  able  to  live  well  and  promote  practices  that  contribute  towards  a  good 
34 
 
life. The pursuit of the good life is the purpose of the state. (Sandel 2009, 192?5 
[Politics 1280a?b].)   
This spirit is also the founding element of Sandel’s critique of liberalism: the Rawlsian 
outlining of the society, which assures certain primary rights, is just not enough for 
Sandel. The Sandelian claim seems to be that a society must be more than a mere 
guarantor  of  rights.  It  must  also  play  a  role  in  the  aspirations  of  achieving  a  good life  
and improving the quality of life for its members. In Aristotelian terms, the purpose of 
human life is to pursue its telos, i.e. to live a virtuous life, and the society must support 
this aspiration by promoting the common good. Thus, the common good is the good that 
aims  towards  the  highest  human  ends  and  a  good  life,  and  common  good  is  achieved  
through practices that contribute towards a good life.   
How, then, is the common good defined? According to Sandel, this notion is defined by 
deliberating with fellow citizens about the common good and helping to shape the 
destiny of the political community. Thus, common good is defined through the 
deliberation of the community, and his politics of the good rest on the idea that 
conceptions of the common good can be deliberated in the community with a virtuous 
practice of politics25. Virtuous politics must first deliberate about the conception of 
common good, and then adjust the principles governing the society to this common 
good. (Sandel 1996, 5–6.)  
Sandel recognizes that the deliberation about the common good is not a simple issue to 
succeed in, and he largely focuses on how the virtuous politics can be achieved. 
According to Sandel, the successful deliberation about the common good requires 
knowledge  of  public  affairs  and  a  sense  of  belonging;  a  concern  for  the  whole  and  a  
moral bond with the community whose fate is  at  stake.  To be able to possess all  these 
elements, the citizens need certain qualities of character: civic virtues. (Sandel 1996, 5–
6.)  
Thus,  civic  virtues  are  such  qualities  of  character  that  enable  us  to  feel  a  sense  of  
belonging and share a moral bond with our fellow citizens. Civic virtues make us realize 
                                               
25 Sandel’s definition of the common good as an outcome of deliberation is confusing because in the 
teleological, or Aristotelian, tradition the common good is usually defined as a natural matter that evolves 
from the society. However, it seems to be that the outcome of Sandel’s deliberation is not genuinely free, 
in a liberal sense, because citizens are expected be of certain kind, possessing civic virtues, and are 
probably expected to deliberate about the common good in a certain way. This emphasizing of the virtue 
maintains Sandel’s political philosophy within the teleological tradition. This issue will be discussed in 
the next sections.  
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that  we  share  one  another’s  fate  and  make  us  understand  the  profound  role  of  the  
community in our existence. With the understanding of this shared fate and a sense of 
belonging, we are motivated to understand our fellow citizens and strive for a mutual 
comprehension in the deliberation about the common good.  
These characterizations of civic virtues make a conclusive connection between Sandel’s 
politics of the common good and his argumentation that opposes genetic enhancements. 
Even  though  Sandel  does  not  directly  term  the  practices  of  solidarity,  humility,  and  
sense of giftedness as civic virtues, it is credible that these values represent that what 
Sandel means by civic virtues. For Sandel, these practices are directly related to the 
sense of belonging and sensing a moral bond with the community. Consequently, losing 
the  sense  of  belonging  is  related  to  losing  the  sense  of  solidarity.  Thus,  solidarity  is  a  
civic virtue, which is required for the virtuous deliberation about the common good, and 
this deliberation is required for the achievement of the common good itself. Hence, 
solidarity is an intrinsic element of the common good.  
In his writings, Sandel does explicitly name a particular civic virtue. According to 
Sandel, the civic virtue distinctive to our time is the capacity to negotiate our way in the 
modern society, in which various conflicting views, interests, tensions and obligations 
take place. This civic virtue means that citizens must be able to take one another’s 
position and act as multiply-situated selves. (Sandel 1996, 350.) This requirement for 
being able to think from many perspectives seems to have exactly the same direction as 
solidarity in aiming to elevate intersubjective understanding and the feeling of shared 
fate.  
Throughout his writings, Sandel discusses a central means to foster civic virtues and the 
sense of sharing fate. This issue, noted in chapter 1 and more thoroughly examined in 
chapter 3, is that the level of socioeconomic inequality should not increase too much.  
According to Sandel, large socioeconomic inequalities decrease the sense of belonging. 
Sandel worries that if inequality is too deep, the lives of the rich and the poor will be so 
distinct that they practically will not encounter one another anymore. This will take 
place if the different socioeconomic classes do not share schools, institutions of daily 
affairs and other public places. According to Sandel, public places should gather people 
together and function as a platform for achieving common experiences, cultivating civic 
engagement and forming habits of citizenship. Sandel emphasizes that the membership 
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and civic identity of the rich and the poor must be affirmed alike. (Sandel 1996, 329? 
333.) 
Thus, Sandel states that when the gap between the rich and the poor increases and their 
lives get separated, the sense of belonging is more difficult to maintain. This means that 
civic virtues become difficult to sustain and the deliberation about the common good 
becomes even more challenging. (Sandel 2005, 57.) The conception of severe inequality 
that degrades the sense of community also originates from Aristotle. According to 
Aristotle, large inequality affects the virtuous practice of politics because the rich, who 
are distracted by luxury, are unwilling to submit to the rule, while the poor, suffering 
from envy and necessity, are too subservient and do not know how to govern. Thus, 
both are incapable for the deliberation about the common good. Furthermore, Aristotle 
highlights that a society of extremes lacks the spirit of friendship. If people are too far 
from  one  another,  the  sense  of  partnership  is  altered  to  a  relation  of  enemies,  and  
enemies do not want to share their fate. (Sandel 1996, 330 [Politics 1295b].) 
Hence,  Sandel  argues  that  the  politics  of  the  good,  or  any  political  philosophy  
attempting to revitalize the sense of community in a society, must consider the 
economic arrangements that are the most hospitable for sustaining civic virtues and a 
sense of belonging (Sandel 2005, 58). Sandel concludes that in order to deliberate about 
the good life and pursue it, the senses of community and social solidarity must be 
strengthened by decreasing the level of socioeconomic inequality. (Sandel 2009, 263–8.) 
Thus,  the  wish  to  decrease  socioeconomic  inequality  could  also  be  counted  as  a  civic  
virtue, connected to the sense of solidarity.   
The recapitulation of Sandel’s notion of the common good is somewhat tautological. 
The Sandelian civic virtues that enable the virtuous deliberation about the common 
good are, for example, the sense of belonging, solidarity, humility, and the ability to 
intersubjective understanding. However, the common good, which is the objective of 
the deliberation facilitated by civic virtues, includes similar contents: the Sandelian 
common  good  seems  to  be  a  situation  in  which  the  members  of  a  society  possess  the  
sense of solidarity, humility, the sense of belonging and the ability to intersubjective 
understanding. Thus, the means and the ends are the same: by sensing solidarity, 
solidarity is achieved.  
However, this structure of an argument is familiar from the Aristotelian teleological 
ethics. For Aristotle, the highest end in human life, happiness, is achieved by the proper 
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function of a man: acting virtuously. Happiness is attained through learning and training 
moral virtues, and moral virtue is formed by habit and acquired by action. According to 
Aristotle, we become just by the practice of just actions and courageous by performing 
the acts of courage. Hence, virtuous characteristics develop from corresponding 
activities. (NE 1097b?1099b, 1103a?b.) 
This  teleological  explanation  clarifies  Sandel’s  argumentation.  The  relation  of  civic  
virtues and the common good is intrinsic: to achieve the common good, that is, to end 
up in a situation in which the members of a society have the sense of solidarity and 
understand each other, the corresponding civic virtues must be practiced and cultivated. 
Thus,  Sandel’s  emphasis  on  social  practices,  such  as  solidarity  and  humility,  becomes  
understandable: for Sandel, they are the constituting elements of the common good and 
the highest human ends.  
2.1.3. Politics of the common good in a modern society 
It  is  relevant  to  ask  how  Sandel  would  realize  his  politics  of  the  common  good  in  a  
modern society. Sandel’s answer affects the interpretation of his argument opposing 
genetic enhancements as well as outlining the possible policies that Sandel would be 
ready to introduce for protecting solidarity and other civic virtues he wants to preserve.  
Sandel wants to distinguish himself from the forms of communitarian politics that seek 
a unitary and uncontestable common good, which is based on tradition. Sandel argues 
that this conventionalist communitarianism gives no more attention to the good than the 
liberalistic rights-based theory. According to Sandel, both of them neglect that what is 
good: liberals leave the good aside in making the right prior, and communitarians do the 
same mistake by making the tradition prior. (Sandel 1998, xi.) 
Sandel recognizes that when politics is related to moral and religious disputes, coercion 
and intolerance could take place. However, Sandel asserts that his vision is more 
clamorous than consensual and that it does not try to uniform people. For such politics 
of moral engagement that maintain the respect for pluralism, Sandel suggests a 
democratic and pluralistic republican politics. (Sandel 1996, 320–321.) Sandel argues 
that democratic and pluralistic republican politics would strengthen the intersubjective 
understanding in a society. According to Sandel, a wide public engagement with moral 
disagreements could elevate mutual respect, when people would listen and learn from 
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each other by deliberating the different views of good life.26 Thus, by introducing moral 
values in the political debate, it would be possible to diminish intolerance.  27  (Sandel 
2009, 268–9.)  
Hence,  Sandel  attempts  to  assert  that  his  vision  of  the  politics  of  the  good  cannot  be  
considered as a return to such conservative politics that defend the efforts of the local 
majorities to ban offensive activities in the name of preserving their community’s 
values, as for example Amy Gutmann suggests28 (Gutmann 1985, 309). It seems that for 
Sandel, the most important thing is not necessarily the outcome of the debate, but the 
process of deliberation that strengthens mutual understanding, communal solidarity and 
togetherness, that is, civic virtues. This process allows pluralistic and opposing views 
and does not necessarily require a unified consensus.  
However, Sandel strongly emphasizes that the deliberators must possess civic virtues in 
order to practice virtuous politics. It seems that Sandel expects the deliberators to be of 
certain kind, appreciating conceptions of the common good in a certain way. Would 
Sandel accept that the definition of the common good be deliberated by citizens that do 
not possess civic virtues? If Sandel requires that the deliberators must be such that they 
arrive at certain notions of the common good, it remains open whether this process is a 
genuine deliberation. This emphasizing of virtue maintains Sandel’s argumentation 
within the teleological tradition, even though his position resembles deontological 
strategies that emphasize negotiating. 
                                               
26According to Pogge, it is impossible that the people in the original position would agree on conceptions 
of the common good. He emphasizes that Rawls’ political liberalism is a practical solution for a social 
system with large disagreement over moral values. (Pogge 1989, 92.) In addition, Amy Gutmann 
highlights the practical value of Rawls’ theory in a pluralistic and modern society. She argues that the 
reason to accept a politics of rights is not the metaphysical priority of the right over the good, but because 
our search for the good requires the society to protect our right to certain basic freedoms and welfare 
goods. Giving priority to justice may be the fairest way of sharing the goods of citizenship with people, 
who disagree about conceptions of the good. (Gutmann 1985, 311–313.) 
27 Sandel discusses especially the situation in the present American society. According to Sandel, the 
intolerant atmosphere of the American life is a consequence of the neutral framework of rights. Sandel 
asserts that such neutrality creates a spurious respect that suppresses the moral argument rather than 
actually avoids it. For Sandel, this suppression combined with a society without a sense of community is 
what actually creates intolerance and prejudice. (Sandel 2009, 268–9.) 
28 Gutmann is skeptical about Sandel’s optimism for creating a democratic and pluralistic republican 
politics. Gutmann states that Sandel has no actual evidence from history that would prove that his 
optimist vision of a settled-rooted society with established traditions and the great tolerance of speech, 
sexuality and religion could ever occur. Gutmann accuses Sandel for wanting to have it both ways: Sandel 
wants to live in a traditional and communal society without having any of its negative impacts. Gutmann 
argues that even though almost anything is possible, including Sandel’s vision, it does not make moral 
sense to leave liberal politics behind on the basis of such speculations. However, Gutmann acknowledges 
the constructive potential that the communitarian emphasis on communal values has on contemporary 
politics, but argues that these values should be viewed as complementing rather than supplanting elements 
to liberal values. (Gutmann 1985, 318–320.) 
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Sandel further strengthens his differentiation from the communitarian theories that aim 
to the unitary good based on tradition by setting limitations for his critique of the 
primacy of rights. Sandel explicates that the question for him is not whether the rights 
should be respected, but whether they can be identified and justified in a way that does 
not presuppose any particular conception of the good. Sandel emphasizes that the issue 
is  not  the  relative  weight  of  the  individual  and  communal  claims,  but  the  relation  
between the right and the good: the rights should depend on the justification for the 
moral importance of their ends. (Sandel 2005, 213.) Nevertheless, Sandel remarks that 
on any theory of justice, certain general rules are required to spare the decision-makers 
the need to recur to the first principles in all the cases that comes to them, but 
sometimes, in hard cases, judges cannot apply such rules without appealing directly to 
the moral purposes that justify rights in the first place. (Sandel 1998, xi–xvi.)  
Thus,  Sandel  is  not  trying  to  replace  the  politics  of  the  rights  with  the  politics  of  the  
good, at least not in the meaning of giving a veto for the community in every case the 
decision-making part of it considers that a particular right offenses its traditions. 
Sandel’s  point  seems to  be  that  rights  as  such  are  not  immune to  critique,  and  can  be  
questioned if they seem to be incompatible with that what is good. In actual situations, 
Sandel would trust the ability of the civic-virtuous decision-making parties’ to 
deliberate, with intersubjective understanding, about what is the common good in that 
particular  situation;  that  is,  what  solution  is  the  most  compatible  with  values  such  as  
solidarity.   
2.2. The common good and genetic enhancements 
Examining Sandel’s philosophical starting point in the virtue-oriented teleology creates 
a foundation for his argumentation about the importance of preserving solidarity. In 
conclusion  to  chapter  2,  I  will  recall  Sandel’s  conception  of  the  common  good  and  
discuss its relation to his argumentation that opposes genetic enhancements. 
As noted, Sandel’s philosophical starting point is the pursuit of good life. With Sandel’s 
neo-Aristotelian terms, the definition of good life is founded on the fundamental role of 
the community in the constitution of the self, the cultivation of the civic virtues, and the 
practice of virtuous politics and the deliberation about the common good. The common 
good and the civic virtues are intrinsic: the elements of the common good can be 
achieved by practicing the corresponding civic virtues. For Sandel, the common good 
entails  a  society  in  which  the  senses  of  solidarity  and  the  sense  of  belonging  flourish,  
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and the realization of this society requires that its members express these characteristics. 
This is why solidarity and the other civic virtues are so important to Sandel. They 
encapsulate good life and the highest human ends.   
Thus, Sandel’s argument is that in order to achieve a good life, it is more important to 
preserve  the  social  practices  of  solidarity  and  humility  and  to  cultivate  these  civic  
virtues than to claim for individual rights in the decision making that concerns genetic 
enhancements or for some speculated overall benefit that the enhancements could 
introduce. According to Sandel’s philosophy, an individual should not automatically 
have the right to choose genetic enhancements because enhancements endanger the 
existence of certain values, such as solidarity, and it is of the greatest importance to 
maintain these values. In the same way as the right is not, at least automatically, prior to 
the good, the right to use genetic enhancements is not automatically prior to the 
preservation of solidarity.  
As Häyry explicates Sandel, the issue with genetic enhancements is not personal 
freedom or  well-being,  but  the  loss  of  important  social  practices,  such  as  the  sense  of  
giftedness, humility, a limited sense of responsibility, and solidarity. These features 
could be lost with the adoption of hyperagency. (Häyry 2010, 34?5.)  Häyry concludes 
that these practices are what morally matter the most to Sandel: the loss of 
unconstrained freedom and material well-being of individuals is a small price to pay for 
the preservation of human dignity and social solidarity. (Häyry 2010, 232.) 
As Hauskeller encapsulates,  virtues are all  that  matter to Sandel and they are what his 
whole argument seems to be about. In the Aristotelian sense, virtue is the precondition 
for the good life, and Hauskeller presumes that a lively appreciation of giftedness might 
well be such a precondition. Hauskeller interprets that to Sandel solidarity is not a 
means  but  an  end,  and  therefore,  it  is  the  virtue  itself  that  must  be  cherished.  It  is  not  
enough to focus on the outcomes of enhancement policies in order to be able to cultivate 
good life. (Hauskeller 2011, 78?9.) 
An interesting issue to be considered is that how Sandel’s democratic and pluralistic 
republicanism would actually function in the case of enhancements. Sandel states that 
the ideal of his republicanism is that it does not aim for unified consensual opinions, but 
allows  clamorous  pluralism.  But  how  would  this  work  in  the  case  of  deliberating  
policies about genetic enhancement? Sandel seems to be quite explicit in that 
enhancements ought not to be introduced.  
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However, as Hauskeller argues, Sandel might not be claiming that no one could choose 
enhancements or that all enhancements should be forbidden. Hauskeller states that 
Sandel is not trying to answer the question whether or not it is morally permissible or 
immoral to practice genetic enhancements, but whether it is a good idea. Hauskeller 
interprets that for Sandel, the question is not about the goodness or badness of 
enhancements, but rather an issue of what makes life good. With the use of 
enhancements, we do not become bad, but we become impoverished and lose something 
essential required for a good human life: the social practices of humility and solidarity. 
(Hauskeller 2011, 77.) Thus, according to Hauskeller’s interpretation, Sandel does not 
try to override all other opinions on enhancements, but attempts to bring his visions 
about the construction of a good life into the debate and to influence the overall views. 
This interpretation is compatible with Sandel’s democratic and pluralistic republicanism.  
However, Sandel’s absoluteness on the undesirability of enhancements can be also 
interpreted in a different way. For example, Harris asserts that Sandel does not only 
offer his argument, but also wants to outlaw all other alternative arguments. Harris 
states that this forbiddance is a way of repressive mastering, by tyrannically controlling 
the lives of others. (Harris 2007, 121?2.) It remains a question how the proponents of 
enhancements would be able to have a say in Sandel’s democratic and pluralistic 
republicanism. It might be that Sandel predicts that if people really were virtuous, in the 
manner  of  cultivating  civic  virtues,  they  would  realize  that  they  do  not  want  use  
enhancements.  
Even though Sandel’s outlining of his democratic and pluralistic republicanism aims to 
be suitable for liberal and modern democracies, it does not dispel the fact that Sandel 
himself represents a tendency for communitarian conservatism, resisting change and 
preserving the present29. In the Case against Perfection, Sandel clearly takes a position 
of a science pessimist, who wants to maintain the present conceptions of normality and 
humanity.  
As Häyry clarifies, the proponents of the more liberal approaches hold that the dangers 
in the new technologies can be dealt with using more or less moderate regulations, 
while Sandel tends to think that bad things will unavoidably happen if certain moral 
                                               
29 Even though Sandel expresses this conservatism, he cannot straightforwardly be said to be conservative 
as value-conservative. Sandel, for example, makes efforts in defending gay rights and abortion with 
arguments not based on rights but conceptions of the good, in that on due reflection, the argument for the 
moral permissibility of these practices is more convincing than the arguments against them. (Sandel 2005, 
237?8.) 
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boundaries in science are overstepped. (Häyry 2010, 190.)  Häyry notes that while the 
science optimists or science enthusiasts are more worried about the irrational communal 
beliefs and precautionary reflections concerning new technologies, science pessimists 
like Sandel are concerned about the pressure that the advances in the life sciences and 
their commercialization might induce in the society.30  (Häyry 2010, 222.) 
Häyry explains that even though Sandel understands the importance of modern science 
in our lives, he denies that it should have a decisive role in the principles that govern the 
society. For Sandel, the decisive role should be directed to dignity and solidarity, and 
these higher values should not be overridden by the effort to improve individual lives. 
Häyry construes that Sandel’s aspiration is to emphasize that, in the era of genetic 
enhancements, the important thing is to empower people to be able to concentrate on 
what is genuinely desirable and make decisions that actually maintain good life, and not 
solely give in to the commercial marketing efforts. Häyry interprets that, for Sandel, 
rejecting genetic technologies and considering children as gifts would be a genuine 
expression of people’s integrity and autonomy against the all-pervading powers of 
bioscientific industry and uncontrolled market economy. (Häyry 2010, 232?3.)  
Häyry’s analysis is compatible with and clarifies Sandel’s claim that the proper kind of 
freedom in our society should be cultivated and the requirements of the society should 
be fitted to our nature, not the other way around. The common good and the highest 
human  ends  should  determine  the  principles  that  govern  the  society,  not  the  aim  to  
maximize the use of new technologies and the improvement of individual lives.  
                                               
30 Häyry notes that the allegiances between the ethical theories and the normative views on scientific 
advances  are  clear,  but  they  could  also  be  the  other  way  around.  By  mixing  tradition  and  progress,  it  
could  also  be  argued  that  our  best  accustomed  ways  of  living  can  be  preserved  only  by  selection  and  
cloning. And we could combine the no-harm ethos of liberal consequentialism with restrictions by 
insisting that the present and future individuals will suffer physically and mentally from the use of novel 
technologies. However, the tradition is linked with restrictions, and choice and well-being are paired with 
permissive policies. The other two logical alternatives are used, if at all, only in counterarguments and in 
inadequately developed forms. (Häyry 2010, 229?230.)  
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3. Sandel’s argument and responsibility-sensitive 
egalitarianism 
Thus far, I have introduced the main elements in Sandel’s argumentation opposing 
genetic enhancements, and the teleological premises in his philosophy explaining why 
Sandel gives such an important role to solidarity: solidarity, among other civic virtues, 
is an intrinsic element of the common good and the highest human ends. It enables both 
the deliberation about the common good and the expression of the common good. 
Following the teleological reasoning Sandel suggests that by expressing solidarity in the 
society, we are able to achieve a society in which the sense of solidarity flourishes.   
In the following chapters 3 and 4, I will proceed in examining the philosophical 
premises in Sandel’s claim about the strong relation between luck and responsibility. On 
what grounds does Sandel suggest that if we became responsible for our genetic 
constitution, we should bear the burden of our decisions concerning our genome? Why 
does he come to the conclusion that if we controlled our genome, the sense of solidarity 
would erode as we would not want to share the burden of the unfortunate anymore? I 
will assert that these claims share the same justification with the principle of 
responsibility of responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism. After showing these similarities, 
I am going to revisit Sandel’s argument by applying to it the critique of responsibility-
sensitive egalitarianism.  
In chapter 3, I will draw the connections between Sandel, egalitarianism and 
responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism. Because responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism 
originates from egalitarian theories, claiming that Sandel’s argument would have 
resemblance merely with the principle of responsibility could remain superficial. In 
order to suggest the similarities, Sandel’s compatibility with egalitarian theories must 
also be demonstrated.  
In section 3.1, I will discuss the concept of egalitarianism and present a definition that 
will be used in this thesis: the core of egalitarianism is in accepting the redistributive 
institutions as a means for mitigating the contingencies that people face in natural and 
social lotteries. This definition is derived from Rawls’ theory of justice as fairness. In 
section 3.2, I am going to introduce the central principle of responsibility-sensitive 
egalitarianism that extends the egalitarian basic principle in that only the outcomes of 
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bad luck should be compensated for with redistributive institutions. I will mainly 
consider Dworkin’s theory of equality of resources here.  
In sections 3.3 and 3.4, I will connect Sandel’s argumentation to these theories. In 3.3, I 
am going to assert that even though Sandel and Rawls have different philosophical 
starting points, Sandel’s philosophical orientation is compatible with the defined 
egalitarian basic principle; it only gives a different justification for the principle. Finally, 
in section 3.4, I will conclude my examination from Sandel’s overall philosophy to his 
argument about genetic enhancement and show that it accords with the fundamental 
principle of responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism. 
3.1. Egalitarianism and luck 
Egalitarian theories are a cluster of varying theses. They all aim at equality, but with 
different approaches and emphases.31 In the context of my thesis, their relevant shared 
characteristic is the normative weight put on contingencies that occur in people’s lives. 
Egalitarian theories assume that natural and social contingencies ought not to have a 
powerful effect in a person’s socioeconomic position, and there should be some kinds of 
redistributive institutions for the mitigation of the differences that arise from the effect 
of these contingencies. This basic assumption is famously presented in Rawls’ A Theory 
of Justice.  
According to Rawls, the basic structure of a just society derives from the assumption 
that neither the distribution of natural assets nor the historical and social fortune should 
settle the distribution of income and wealth. Natural talents and the socioeconomic 
position one is in born are a matter of luck, morally arbitrary, and not deserved. Hence, 
no one actually deserves the merits of his great natural capacities or favourable social 
starting place; neither the disadvantageous outcomes of contingencies. Thus, these 
undeserved inequalities must be compensated for the unfortunate; this is because 
without the mitigation of the arbitrary effects of natural and social lotteries, the society 
cannot  provide  genuine  equality  of  opportunity  for  its  citizens.  Rawls  emphasizes  that  
even individuals’ willingness to try and make an effort, and the following development 
of natural capacities, is affected by various social circumstances and class attitudes. The 
                                               
31 Different approaches include theories such as equality of fair opportunity (Rawls 1999a), equality of 
access to advantage (Cohen 1989), equality of opportunity for welfare (Arneson 1989), equality of 
resources (Dworkin 1981), equality of capabilities (Sen 2009), or approaches that emphasize political 
equality and equal personhood instead of some metric measure of equality (Scheffler 2003, Anderson 
1999).  
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outcomes of natural and social lotteries are mere natural facts, not issues of justice; what 
is just or unjust is the way that institutions deal with these facts32. (Rawls 1999a, 64, 
86?7.)    
In this context, egalitarian theories contrast theories that do not assume that the 
contingencies in natural and social lotteries should be mitigated with redistributive 
institutions. Such non-egalitarian theories consider a person’s maintenance of his initial 
natural and social assets morally weightier than leveling of the playing field with 
societal compensations. Thus, the difference is in the normative weight given to the 
different moralities: egalitarians hold that the strongest moral must is in levelling the 
playing field, while non-egalitarians hold that it is in preserving one’s individual rights, 
including ownership rights; thus, intervening with one’s wealth in the name of 
achieving equality is not considered to be moral. 33  Thus, the distinction is in the 
different views of the legitimacy of redistributive institutions. 
When drawing generalizations about the different notions of the distributive institutions 
and responsibility, it is important to recall the fundamental differences between the 
philosophical orientations of Rawls and Sandel, introduced in chapter 2: Rawls’ 
background is in deontology, and Sandel draws from teleology. However, both the 
concepts of egalitarianism and non-egalitarianism are compatible with the language of 
rights and the language of the common good: redistributive institutions can be defended 
either  because  they  are  considered  to  foster  the  primary  rights  that  people  possess,  or  
because they are considered to promote the common good. Therefore, the given notion 
of egalitarianism is not sensitive to the debate on whether a priority should be given to 
the good or to the rights. These claims will be further clarified in the upcoming sections.  
                                               
32 Rawls’ argumentation about the undeserved nature of natural talent and social position is of great 
importance when justifying his second principle of justice, the difference principle, which has major role 
in the legitimization of redistributive institutions. Because of this undeserved nature, it is justified that 
social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are to the greatest benefit of the least 
advantage (Rawls 1999a, 266). However, the level of equality that the difference principle would ensure 
can be questioned; according to the difference principle, the rich could give only a minimal portion of 
their wealth to the poor and still follow the difference principle, especially if the difference principle is 
viewed in its initial formulation, i.e., social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are 
reasonably expected to be to everyone’s advantage (Rawls 1999a, 53). Nevertheless, considering Rawls’ 
powerful argumentation on the undeserved nature of natural talents and socioeconomic positions, it seems 
to be justified to suggest that Rawls is actually aspiring at a meaningful level of redistribution.  
33 For example, Robert Nozick represents this non-egalitarian, libertarian approach. Nozick holds that 
individual rights, including ownership rights, are the most fundamental rights in a society, and these 
rights ought not to be violated in the name of state-oriented redistributive institutions. (Nozick 1975, 189–
197, 213–216.) 
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Hence, in this thesis, I will use the term egalitarianism to refer to those who, with a 
justification  by  rights  or  by  conceptions  on  the  common  good,  aim  to  some  equality  
with redistributive institutions, and non-egalitarianism to refer to those who, with a 
justification by rights or by conceptions on common good, do not accept redistributive 
institutions.  
3.2. Egalitarianism, luck, and responsibility 
As indicated, the aspiration to mitigate the contingencies of natural and social lotteries 
with redistributive institutions is an overarching element in egalitarian theories. 
However, a certain branch has developed the normative status of luck to a deeper level 
by restricting the domain of compensable features only to the outcomes of bad luck. 
This focusing is made by the so called responsibility-sensitive egalitarians, or luck-
egalitarians34. While the egalitarian basic idea is about including the contingencies of 
the natural and social lotteries in the compensable domain, the luck-egalitarians make a 
stricter demarcation in the matters that are not in our responsibility and exclude other 
issues from the compensable domain. The core idea of egalitarianism does not contain 
such exclusion.  
In general, the responsibility-sensitive egalitarians hold that inequalities that derive 
from the unchosen features in people’s circumstances are unjust, while they are 
acceptable if they derive from the choices people make voluntarily. Hence, the principle 
of responsibility of the responsibility-sensitive egalitarian theories holds that unequal 
outcomes are just if they arise from factors for which individuals can properly be held 
responsible; otherwise they are unjust. (Mason 2006, 216.) The original systematic 
formulation of a responsibility-sensitive egalitarian position was formulated by Ronald 
Dworkin (1981)35, and further developed by e.g. Richard Arneson (1989) and G.A. 
Cohen (1989), and lately represented by Andrew Mason (2006).  
                                               
34 The term ‘luck-egalitarianism’ was first introduced by Anderson (1999), in criticizing this theory. It is 
worth to note that none of the ‘luck-egalitarians’ identify themselves with that notion, but they all give 
different names to their theories. For example, Dworkin names his theory as equality of resources, 
Arneson as equal opportunity to welfare or later responsibility-catering prioritanism, and Cohen as equal 
access to advantage. I will use the terms responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism and luck-egalitarianism 
interchangeably.  
35 Dworkin makes his own distinction concerning the theories of justice which reflects the distinction 
made here. Dworkin classifies them to be continuous, i.e., ethically sensitive, or discontinuous, i.e., 
ethically insensitive. Continuous theories, such as Dworkin’s equality of resources, base their judgments 
on the justice or injustice of any distribution of wealth, property, or opportunities on assignments of 
responsibility that distinguish between choice and circumstance. In contrast, discontinuous theories do not 
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Dworkin names his theory as theory of equality of resources36.  The  starting  point  of  
equality of resources is in a hypothetical auction, taking place in a desert island, where a 
number of shipwreck survivors end up. The immigrants start to build a community, 
accepting that none of them is originally entitled to any of the abundant resources in the 
island, but that the resources will be equally divided by them. The equal distribution is 
realized with an equal number of clamshells to each immigrant, and individuals can 
decide the resources in which they wish to invest their proportion of clamshells. 
According to Dworkin the division is equal when no one envies one another’s bundle of 
resources. Thus, people get to decide the relative value they give to various resources. 
(Dworkin 2000, 65?70.)   
Dworkin’s hypothetical starting position, in which every immigrant ought to have the 
same proportion of clamshells and should end up with relatively same worth of 
belongings, begins on an egalitarian ground. However, the egalitarian requirement for 
mitigating the outcomes of contingencies truly appears only after the auction. Dworkin 
notes that the initial equality of resources, gained in the auction, will not hold very long 
because people will act differently with their proportion of clamshells and belongings. 
These  differences  derive  from the  different  talents  affecting  the  development  of  one’s  
resources, different tastes and ambitions influencing how the resources are invested, and 
also the various accidents and coincidences that people face. As Dworkin suggests, 
these natural and social contingencies that people face in their lives should be 
compensated for with redistributive institutions. (Dworkin 2000, 73.)    
Thus, Dworkin’s theory is compatible with the shared characteristic of the egalitarian 
theories that Rawls originally positioned: that redistributive institutions are required for 
the mitigation of natural and social contingencies. It is noteworthy that the egalitarian 
core idea does not consider the level of pursued equality, but only entails that a 
meaningful, or more than insignificant, level of equality must be aspired after. Thus, in 
this context, it is not significant whether Dworkin and Rawls really reach the same level 
of equality or not; what matters is that they both validate redistributive institutions with 
similar argumentation.  
                                                                                                                                          
reflect the distinctions and assignments of responsibility in deploying standards of just distribution. 
(Dworkin 2000, 323?5.)  
36 By resources, Dworkin means privately owned resources, although he admits that private resources are 
overlapping with publicly or commonly owned resources, such as political power (Dworkin 2000, 65). 
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However, by requiring a certain criterion for the matters that ought to be compensated 
through redistributive institutions, Dworkin alters his theory into a theory of 
responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism. This criterion is whether a born inequality was 
derived from brute luck or option luck. Option luck is the outcome of deliberate and 
calculated gambles that have been entered by choice, while brute luck is the outcome of 
gambles  in  which  the  participation  was  not  deliberate.  For  example,  a  bad  outcome in  
the stock market is a matter of option luck, whereas being hit by a meteorite is a matter 
of brute luck. Inequalities that derive from brute luck are a matter of injustice and ought 
to  be  compensated  for,  but  if  inequalities  are  the  outcome of  option  luck,  there  are  no  
reasons for claiming compensation. Hence, outcomes of option luck are choices while 
outcomes of brute luck are circumstances. 37  (Dworkin 2000, 73.) This principle of 
responsibility which emphasizes individual responsibility and the normative distinction 
of choices and circumstances is the fundamental element in responsibility-sensitive 
egalitarian theories in general.  
Dworkin argues that these categories of choice and circumstance are connected to one’s 
personality. They reflect a person’s personality, which is constituted from ambition and 
character. Ambition comprises of tastes, preferences and plans of life, that is, ambitions 
for making one choice rather than some other. Thus, even if a person had expensive 
tastes and required more resources for a satisfactory life, he could not claim 
compensation from the society because his tastes belong to the category of choice. A 
person’s  character  consists  of  the  traits  of  personality  affecting  the  ways  in  which  
ambitions can be pursued, such as a person’s energy, industry and persistence. 
(Dworkin 2000, 322–323.)  
In contrast, circumstances include personal and impersonal resources. Personal 
resources contain physical and mental health and ability, general fitness and capacities, 
                                               
37 According to Dworkin, a system of insurances creates a link between brute luck and option luck. 
Insurances incorporate the events of brute luck to the domain of option luck, because it is possible to 
make deliberate decisions about having an insurance against non-deliberate accidences. Dworkin outlines 
a hypothetical insurance market in the initial auction. If a person did not want insurance for some 
particular brute luck, it would mean, according to Dworkin, that he apparently did not give such a value 
for avoiding it that he could claim compensation if that brute luck happened to him. Dworkin argues that 
not buying insurances is similar to taking part in a gamble: those who gamble and lose or gamble and win 
are in the same position because the chosen life as a gambler includes the risk of losing. Dworkin 
nevertheless accepts certain paternalistic policies that forbid some gambles and limit the amount that an 
individual is able to risk in his life. (Dworkin 2000, 74?7.) Thus, Dworkin’s hypothetical insurance 
actually enlarges the domain of choice and diminishes the domain of circumstance. This new limitation 
raises the question that if nearly all brute lucks are actually option lucks because of the available 
insurances, will people ever get any compensation if they lack insurances?   
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including what Dworkin terms ‘wealth-talent’, the innate capacity to produce goods or 
services  that  will  result  in  wealth.  On  the  other  hand,  impersonal  resources  are  the  
wealth, property, and provided opportunities that one commands, that is, the resources 
that can be reassigned from one person to another. Thus, outcomes of a person’s 
ambition and character are not compensable, whereas the outcomes of personal and 
impersonal resources are. (Dworkin 2000, 322–323.)  
Following the responsibility-sensitive egalitarian doctrine, Dworkin emphasizes the 
importance of the distinction between choices and circumstances to our personal ethics. 
He  states  that  we  are  to  take  responsibility  for  our  voluntary  choices;  choices  that  are  
freely made and not dictated or manipulated by others. Furthermore, we must blame 
ourselves for the bad choices we have made and try to cultivate our ambitions in order 
to be able to make better ones. On the other hand, there is no reason to take 
responsibility for the outcomes of unchosen circumstances, and it is possible to claim 
compensation if one is not satisfied with his impersonal resources. Responsibility must 
be  taken  for  one’s  own choices,  but  one  cannot  be  responsible  for  what  is  beyond his  
control. (Dworkin 2000, 323.) 
The most debated feature among responsibility-sensitive egalitarians is the distinction 
between voluntary choices and circumstances, and the question how this distinction can 
be defined reasonably. Both Arneson and Cohen generally agree with the principle of 
responsibility, but amplify the demarcation between choice and circumstance. Arneson 
argues, for example, that preferences ought not to be simplified into the category of 
choices because of their circumstantial origin (Arneson 1989, 79?80) and that the 
principle of responsibility should be interpreted as a matter of degree; it is better to give 
compensation to the one who is less responsible for his present condition (Arneson 2000, 
344). In addition, Cohen addresses the problem of the ‘chosen personality’ and asserts 
especially that expensive tastes cannot, in principal, be placed in the category of choice 
(Cohen 1989, 922?8; 2004, 3?18). Also, Mason outlines a formulation of 
responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism that strongly emphasizes the influence of the 
different social structures to ‘voluntary choices’ as a limiting element of responsibility 
(Mason 2006, 188?193).  
Thus, these theorists face the first issue of responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism, i.e. the 
obscure line between the issues derived from circumstances and from voluntary choices, 
by toning down the normative distinction between choice and circumstance. They 
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outline moderate versions of this distinction, through recognizing the obscurities within 
the  different  categories  of  personality  and  circumstances.  However,  it  is  notable  that  
none of the theorists question the principle of responsibility as such, but only the limits 
of its application.  
Also Dworkin admits that the difference between his two concepts of luck and the 
distinction between choice and circumstance is a matter of degree, and in his writings, 
he actually considers many of the revisions proposed by the other authors. Dworkin 
concedes that it might be difficult to identify the category in which a particular piece of 
bad luck would belong. For example, is lung cancer the outcome of bad option luck 
because one has chosen smoking and other harmful lifestyles, or a bad brute luck due to 
genetic and environmental factors? Or is someone’s failure to find employment at a 
decent wage a consequence of his lack of wealth-talent, a compensable matter of 
personal resources, or his lack of industry, a non-compensable matter of a person’s 
character? Dworkin recognizes that some elements in a personality classified in the field 
of responsibility and choice can be so disabling – even symptoms of mental disorders – 
that they should be counted as handicaps. In addition, he argues that even though most 
of the personal resources are affected by past choices and attitudes, including health 
care and education, these choices themselves are affected by unchosen domestic and 
cultural influences. Thus, he concludes that the categories of choice and circumstance 
are indeed overlapping. (Dworkin 2000, 73–74, 324.)  
As noted, the overarching principle of egalitarianism is the aspiration to mitigate the 
effects of natural or social contingencies with redistributive institutions. In contrast, 
theories of responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism specify that the elements that ought to 
be compensated for by the society are restricted particularly and only to the outcomes of 
bad luck that derives from circumstances, and no compensations can be claimed in 
situations where individual responsibility is involved. However, some authors question 
this demarcation, and argue that the principle of responsibility would actually originate 
from the overarching principle of egalitarianism.  
Will Kymlicka argues that the normative distinction between choices and circumstances 
is one of the central intuitions of Rawls. According to Kymlicka, Rawls himself did not 
realize the full implications of this normative distinction, and should have emphasized it 
instead of focusing on the difference principle, which is not sensitive to choices. 
Kymlicka says that Dworkin’s theory succeeds better in fulfilling the Rawlsian intuition 
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on the normative distinction between choice and circumstance. Thus, Kymlicka argues 
that the luck-egalitarian formulation is more faithful to Rawls’ original insight than 
Rawls  himself  was,  because  the  difference  principle  interferes  with  the  choice-
circumstance distinction by aiming to uplift the position of the worst-off, regardless of 
the choices or circumstances included. (Kymlicka 2002, 70?5.)  
Samuel Scheffler disagrees with this claim. He offers an explanation about the reasons 
why Rawls can be interpreted as a responsibility-sensitive egalitarian and why these 
interpretations are misleading. Scheffler argues that Rawls actually lays no claims to 
including the principle of responsibility in his theory.   
According to Scheffler, the reason why Rawls is misinterpreted is in his formulation 
that social contingencies and natural fortune are arbitrary from a moral point of view, 
and that the distribution of resources should not be improperly influenced by them 
(Rawls 1999a, 64, 86?7). This notion is cited as the initiating luck-egalitarian 
formulation that inequalities deriving from unchosen circumstances are unjust. 
(Scheffler 2003, 9?11.)  
However, Scheffler argues that Rawls did not even try to respect the distinction between 
choices and circumstances. Scheffler states that Rawls emphasizes the moral 
arbitrariness of natural and social contingencies, because it creates a basis for the 
redistributing difference principle by showing that those well-off owe much of their 
success  to  arbitrary  factors.  Thus,  Rawls  aims  to  justify  a  redistributive  scheme in  the  
society, and not to validate a connection between responsibility, choice and luck. 
Furthermore, Rawls aims to identify the most reasonable conception of justice in order 
to regulate the basic structure of a modern democratic society, and not to consider any 
particular cases of voluntary choices or unfortunate circumstances. (Scheffler 2003, 
25?26.) 
Scheffler’s explanation about the responsibility-sensitive egalitarian fallacy in their 
interpretation  of  Rawls  appears  sound.  As  Scheffler  notes,  the  emphasis  on  the  
normative distinction between choice and circumstance is not a central element in 
Rawls’ philosophy, and his aspiration to mitigate natural and social contingencies is 
connected to the justification of the difference principle. As will be discussed in chapter 
4, Rawls’ social contract theory does not aim to categorize compensable issues based on 
individual responsibilities, but focuses on assuring certain primary assets to every 
member of the society, regardless of the absence or presence of responsibilities.  
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3.3. Sandel and egalitarianism 
In the following sections 3.3 and 3.4, I will examine Sandel’s relation to egalitarianism 
and responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism. In 3.3, I am going to demonstrate that even 
though Sandel’s philosophical position is different from that of Rawls and does not 
focus on rights, Sandel does share the basic egalitarian idea presented in this thesis: the 
aspiration for redistributive institutions for the mitigation of natural and social 
contingencies. In 3.4, I will extend the similarities to responsibility-sensitive egalitarian 
theories and argue that Sandel’s argumentation about the relation of luck and 
responsibility is compatible with these theories.  
In claiming that Sandel and Rawls share a certain similar philosophical premise, 
oversimplified statements must not be presented. This is because Rawls, a deontologist, 
gives a priority to rights, whereas Sandel, a virtue-ethicist, emphasizes conceptions of 
the good. Thus, possible similarities must not be made too easily and cannot be 
expanded too far. Despite these restrictions, I argue that the overarching principle in the 
egalitarian theories can be found in Sandel’s thinking.  
To start with similarities, Sandel and Rawls share a very similar rhetoric about the 
normative position of social and natural contingencies. As discussed in chapter 1, 
Sandel argues in The Case against Perfection that when recognizing the contingency of 
our talents and fortunes, we realize that the profit gained from these contingencies is not 
deserved, and we must share our wealth with the ones who did not have such a good 
luck (Sandel 2007, 89?91). Thus, the contingencies in natural and social lotteries have a 
part in explaining the differences in people’s wealth as the outcomes of luck. Therefore, 
redistributive institutions are justified because people do not deserve their natural assets 
and must share their wealth with the unfortunate. This argumentation is much alike 
Rawls’ notion, described in section 3.1.    
Despite this similar rhetoric, it is important to notice the crucial difference in their 
deeper motivation. To be able to claim, in a philosophically valid manner, that both 
Sandel and Rawls share the overarching principle of egalitarianism, it must be explained 
how this is possible, considering their differing philosophical positions in deontology 
and teleology. The central issue required in order to justify my claim is to demonstrate 
their different argumentations for the egalitarian principle. Thus, I claim that they arrive 
to the same conclusion, but with dissimilar reasoning: Sandel’s argumentation 
emphasizes virtues while that of Rawls highlights rights.  
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Chapter 2 introduced Sandel’s philosophical background as a virtue-ethicist. As 
illustrated, Sandel’s first principle in philosophy is pursuing good life. A good life is 
achieved by living a virtuous life, and the purpose of a state is to support this by 
promoting the common good. The common good is the good that promotes the highest 
human ends and a good life, and the common good is achieved through practices that 
contribute  towards  a  good  life.  Furthermore,  the  definition  of  the  common  good  is  
deliberated in the community, and the principles that govern the society ought to derive 
from this common good.  
What are the most central to the common good are civic virtues, including the senses of 
solidarity, belonging and intersubjective understanding. These senses create a moral 
bond with the community, motivate mutual respect and understanding, and enable a 
successful deliberation about the common good. The civic virtues are intrinsic to the 
common good: by practicing civic virtues that are part of the common good, the 
expression  of  these  virtues  is  maintained  and  enforced  in  the  society,  and  the  society  
itself  becomes  more  virtuous.  Thus,  for  Sandel,  the  common good entails  a  society  in  
which the sense of solidarity flourishes, and this common good is achieved by 
expressing solidarity. In Sandel’s philosophy, the motivation for redistributive 
institutions can be drawn from these features.  
According to Sandel, redistributive institutions are required because large societal 
inequalities decrease the sense of belonging. As explained in chapter 2, Sandel argues 
that if the lives of the different socioeconomic groups are too dissimilar, they will 
practically not encounter each other anymore. And if the members of the society do not 
achieve common experiences and are not able to cultivate a shared civic identity, they 
will lose their mutual understanding and the sense of a shared fate. (Sandel 1996, 333; 
2009, 266?7.) 
This losing of the sense of belonging represents the loss of what Sandel appreciates the 
most: civic virtues. If the sense of a shared fate and a moral bond with the community 
vanishes, it is obvious that civic virtues, such as solidarity, are difficult to sustain. 
Furthermore, it is not likely that the deliberation on the common good successes, as the 
motivation for defining the common good is not present. Thus, Sandel suggests that 
economic inequalities should not be too severe, because otherwise the practice of 
characteristics that cultivate the common good, and the common good itself, become 
unattainable. Therefore, Sandel concludes that economic arrangements should be 
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adjusted so that they are the most hospitable for sustaining civic virtues and the sense of 
community (Sandel 2005, 58).  
Sandel notes that these economic arrangements are not to be only, for example, charity 
or other communal practices, but explicitly suggests these measures to be institutional 
taxation practices, i.e. redistributive institutions. As Sandel suggests,  
A politics of common good would ... tax the affluent to rebuild public 
institutions and services to that rich and poor alike would want to take 
advantage of them. …  Focusing on the civic consequences of inequality 
... would also help highlight the connection between distributive justice 
and the common good. (Sandel 2009, 267?8.) 
Thus, Sandel does support statist redistributive institutions with the intention to 
reinforce civic virtues and the sense of belonging in the society. The common good 
requires that socioeconomic inequality should not increase too much and it is the task of 
the society, or the political authority38, to support the promotion of the common good.  
 
Sandel himself notices that he and Rawls share the same outcome with different 
reasoning. Sandel points out their differences in varying conceptions of freedom. Sandel 
notes that the Rawlsian justification for redistributive institutions draws from the liberal 
conception of freedom. This conception, incorporated in Rawls’ first principle of justice, 
entails that, in order to provide genuine freedom for its citizens, the society must assure 
a measure of social and economic security that is sufficient to the meaningful exercise 
of the individual plans of life. Sandel himself worries about societal inequalities because 
they endanger a republican conception of freedom: severe inequality undermines 
freedom by corrupting the character of both rich and poor and thus destroying the 
commonality necessary to self-governing. (Sandel 1996, 330.)  
Sandel’s notion of self-governing is intrinsic to his emphasis on the virtuous 
deliberation about the common good. If a community is not able to deliberate about the 
common good, it is obvious that some other conception or principle will rule the society. 
And as the role and the character of the community are central to Sandel, he cannot 
                                               
38 Even  though  Sandel  does  not  explicitly  mention  who  should  be  the  executor  of  the  tax  system,  it  is  
plausible that Sandel does not rely only to volunteer-based communal practices, as some interpretation of 
republicanism could suggest. The task of promoting the common good that Sandel addresses to the 
political community, or to the self-governing republic, is such that some political authority, and not only 
political tradition, is needed. Furthermore, Sandel himself speaks about taxes, and taxes are not founded 
on voluntariness, but on obligatoriness. Thus, he must presume some political authority for the execution 
of the tax system. Sandel endorses a subsidiarity principle, thus he opposes strong federal state policies 
and advocates for republican self-government. However, this aspiration for self-government does not 
resist compulsory statist practices. 
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consider it acceptable that the principles governing the society would not be derived 
from the conceptions of good of that society.  
Thus, Sandel lays claims to redistributive institutions because they preserve and 
strengthen community institutions by assuring that the lives of the rich and the poor will 
not be too separated, and thus, pursuing the common good remains possible. On the 
other hand, Rawls argues that it is a primary right of every citizen to achieve a certain 
measure of economic goods from the society.  
With this analysis, I propose that it is justified to claim that Sandel does share the 
overarching principle of egalitarian theories. Obviously, the range of application of this 
similarity is limited and further comparisons between Rawls’ deontological and 
Sandel’s teleological theories cannot be assumed based on the correspondence proposed 
here. However, this correspondence is enough to relate Sandel to egalitarian theories. 
Hence, it is possible to suggest a connection between Sandel and responsibility-
sensitive egalitarian theories.   
3.4. Sandel and responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism 
After demonstrating that the egalitarian basic idea can be identified within Sandel’s 
thinking, I will proceed in substantiating its similarities with responsibility-sensitive 
egalitarianism. As defined, the basic principle of responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism 
is the criterion of responsibility in qualifying the misfortunes that society ought to 
compensate  the  individual  for.  That  is,  the  inequalities  that  derive  from  the  unchosen  
features of people’s circumstances are unjust, but inequalities are acceptable if they 
derive from the choices people make voluntarily. This rhetoric is explicit in Sandel’s 
argumentation about the increase in responsibility and the decrease in solidarity that the 
use of genetic enhancements would produce.  
As demonstrated in chapter 1, Sandel argues that the mastering of our genetic 
composition would increase individual responsibility when parents became liable for 
choosing or not choosing the most pre-eminent traits for their children. Parents would 
be held responsible not only for the choices they make of the use of genetic 
enhancements, but also for the outcomes of their choices. Sandel argues that power 
increases responsibility: the more we can influence our genetic constitution and attribute 
less to chance and more to choice, the more we become responsible for our genome. 
(Sandel 2007, 87.)   
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The diminishing social solidarity, for its part, follows the new powerful position of 
responsibility, as the sense of owing to the less fortunate would vanish. Sandel argues 
that the obligation to share our wealth, gained through contingencies, is with those who, 
through no fault of their own, lack comparable gifts (Sandel 2007, 91). However, this 
premise of social solidarity would alter if choice replaced chance. If the lack of talents 
resulted from a choice of not using genetic enhancements, instead of chance, the 
criterion of no fault of their own would be lost. Hence, Sandel ascribes a powerful 
relationship between responsibility and the ability to choose, which is similar to 
responsibility-sensitive egalitarian theories. One is to be responsible for the matters that 
he can control but not responsible for what is beyond his control. Therefore, the ability 
to master one’s genetic constitution would be remarkable to the conception of 
responsibility. 
Sandel’s  conception  of  responsibility  is  explicit  in  that  it  is  not  only  a  type  of  moral  
responsibility that could cause social judgment, but it also has effects in redistributive 
measures. Sandel suggests that when chance would be replaced with choice with the use 
of genetic engineering, those at the bottom of society would be viewed not as 
disadvantaged, and so worthy of a measure of compensation (Sandel 2007, 92), and a 
willingness to share the fruits of good fortune through institutions of social solidarity 
would be at risk (Sandel 2007, 96). Thus, Sandel seems to hold the idea that if a person 
did not choose a certain desirable trait for himself, such as better intelligence or hearing, 
that person would be responsible for his defect and could not claim compensations in 
his situation. This line of thinking resembles the responsibility-sensitive egalitarian 
principles.  
The similarities between Sandel’s argumentation on genetic enhancements and 
responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism have been also noted by other authors. For 
example, Harris relates Sandel’s argument to luck-egalitarianism when Sandel 
explicates the source of social solidarity and the sense of owing as being derived from 
the  recognition  of  contingency  in  the  talents  people  possess.  Harris  argues  that  Sandel  
draws from the luck-egalitarian tradition in holding that people who are worse-off than 
others through no fault of their own are owed some form of compensation. (Harris 2007, 
120.) Also, Kamm associates Sandel to luck-egalitarianism. According to Kamm, 
Sandel shares the luck-egalitarian idea that if we possessed some traits but had them as 
a matter of luck or through other people’s choices, the costs of having them should be 
shared; whereas the costs of the chosen traits or the lack of them, have no reason to be 
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shared. Thus, Kamm suggests that, for Sandel, the level of claim we have against others 
for aid is thoroughly related to the level of responsibility for choosing or not choosing 
certain characteristics. (Kamm 2005, 12?3.) 
Hence, in his argumentation, Sandel creates a normative distinction between choice and 
circumstance, and seems to place the redistributive scheme under a responsibility-
sensitive criterion, similarly to the responsibility-sensitive egalitarians. Responsibility-
sensitive egalitarians use the concepts of choice and circumstance, and in the context of 
genetic enhancements, Sandel replaces circumstances with chance; however, these two 
concepts share the relevant characteristics of contingency and being beyond control.  
It is notable that the themes of solidarity and the relation between responsibility and 
luck are present in Sandel’s philosophy in a very different manner. Sandel explicitly 
discusses the relation between luck and responsibility only in The Case against 
Perfection when he considers the influence that genetic enhancements might have in the 
society. In contrast, the issue of solidarity is explored throughout his writings: Sandel’s 
philosophy focuses on criticizing the rights-based framework in a society that aims to 
the  state’s  neutrality  on  conceptions  of  the  good,  and  in  promoting  a  politics  of  moral  
engagement that aims to the deliberation about the common good. In this teleological 
reasoning, solidarity and the sense of community are essential.  
Hence, the analysis on Sandel’s normative position regarding chance, choice and 
responsibility can be contemplated only based on The Case against Perfection, and 
these notions cannot be reflected to his other philosophical writings. Actually, as will be 
demonstrated in the next chapters, it seems that the principle of responsibility is not 
compatible with Sandel’s fundamental philosophical premises. Thus, even though I 
claim that Sandel’s argumentation on genetic enhancement has similar characteristics 
with responsibility-sensitive egalitarian theories, I do not claim that Sandel would be a 
responsibility-sensitive egalitarian. As Sandel does not consider the principle of 
responsibility anywhere else, it remains an open question on what grounds Sandel 
adopts this notion in The Case against Perfection. 
The presence of the responsibility-sensitive egalitarian rhetoric in The Case against 
Perfection and  the  lack  of  it  in  Sandel’s  other  writings  underline  that  in  The Case 
against Perfection Sandel presumably does not develop an argument about the ways in 
which he wishes that the notions of humility, solidarity and responsibility ought to 
develop in the era of genetic enhancements, but the ways in which he predicts they will 
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alter. As the knowledge about Sandel’s actual opinion towards the responsibility-
sensitive egalitarian theories and their principle of responsibility is inadequate, Sandel’s 
relation to them can only be conjectured: Sandel might believe that the present society 
follows, whether or not he so wishes, the responsibility-sensitive egalitarian doctrine, 
and he only applies this principle to the era of genetic enhancements; or he can predict 
that, during the era of genetic enhancements, the responsibility-sensitive egalitarian 
doctrine will be adopted, whether or not he so wishes. Furthermore, as an opponent of 
genetic enhancements, Sandel might be merely giving the most disquieting future 
scenario, which he thinks is a responsibility-sensitive egalitarian one, with the aspiration 
to direct the public opinion towards banning genetic enhancements. There are numerous 
possible interpretations.  
Hence, the analysis of the relation between Sandel’s notions on chance, choice and 
responsibility, and responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism, can say little about Sandel’s 
philosophical stance towards luck-egalitarianism, because in The Case against 
Perfection, he only predicts what would happen in the era of genetic enhancements, 
without taking any position to the principle of responsibility as such. Even though it is 
clear that Sandel judges his prediction and considers it undesirable, it is not clear 
whether he does this merely because he resists genetic enhancements, or also because he 
resists the principle of responsibility.  
Either  way,  Sandel’s  argument is in a form of responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism, 
and can be criticized according to it. If Sandel is making a descriptive argument, it is 
worth to ask why Sandel takes the predominant position of the principle of 
responsibility in the society as a self-evident fact. Despite the inability of having an 
analytical framework for the conceptions of chance, choice and responsibility from 
Sandel’s other writings, the responsibility-sensitive egalitarian interpretation of Sandel’s 
argumentation on genetic enhancement provides powerful tools for assessing the 
plausibility of the argument as such.  
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4. Sandel’s argument and the critique of responsibility-
sensitive egalitarianism    
By now, the fundamental principles of responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism have been 
presented, and it has been asserted that Sandel’s argumentation is compatible with these 
principles. In this chapter, I will consider the new perspectives that may be given by the 
responsibility-sensitive egalitarian interpretation of Sandel’s argumentation on genetic 
enhancements. In order to carry out this analysis, I will first examine the thorough 
critique to the principle of responsibility of responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism given 
by Scheffler. After presenting this critique, I will apply it to the relation between chance, 
choice and responsibility that Sandel presents in his argument.  
4.1. Scheffler’s appraisal of responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism  
Scheffler begins his critique by questioning the overall project of responsibility-
sensitive egalitarianism. He asserts that the attempt to create a responsibility-based 
conception of egalitarian justice, which he notes to be one of the central preoccupations 
of contemporary philosophy, is merely an effort to answer to the non-egalitarian critique 
of egalitarianism. This critique entails that egalitarian policies rely on and enforce a 
diminished  conception  of  individual  responsibility  and  choice.  It  is  claimed  that  a  
principle of responsibility is violated by rewarding, with redistributive institutions, 
those who are lazy or unwilling to work, and by penalizing the industrious and hard-
working by forcing them to take part in the redistributive institutions. As Scheffler 
adduces, the egalitarian response asserts that the most important source of inequalities 
and poverty is not the level of personal industry and energy, but the differences in social 
class, inherited wealth and natural ability, none of which individuals choose for 
themselves and therefore cannot be held responsible for. But apart from demonstrating 
the more plausible reasons for societal inequalities, many political philosophers have 
tried to defuse conservative criticism of egalitarian liberalism and the welfare state by 
showing that choice and responsibility can actually be incorporated into an egalitarian 
theory of distributive justice. 39  According to Scheffler, this is the background for 
responsibility-sensitive egalitarian theories. (Scheffler 2005, 5–7.) 
                                               
39 Dworkin explicitly offers his theory of equality of resources as a response to the requirements of 
personal responsibility in a welfare strategy that the non-egalitarian critique poses by accusing that 
egalitarian policies maintain a ‘culture of dependency’ (Dworkin 2000, 325?8). Also, Cohen points out 
that one of the achievements of luck-egalitarianism is that it succeeded to demonstrate that egalitarians 
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As presented, central to luck-egalitarianism is the principle of responsibility which 
emphasizes individual responsibility and the normative distinction of choices and 
circumstances: unequal outcomes are just if they arise from factors for which 
individuals can properly be held responsible; otherwise they are unjust. Scheffler states 
that the luck-egalitarians join the non-egalitarians in asserting the principle of 
responsibility as a fundamental principle of political morality, but differ sharply from 
the non-egalitarians in their interpretation of the principle and its implications: the non-
egalitarians will end up in preserving one’s wealth, whereas the egalitarians will claim 
for redistributive institutions. However, Scheffler argues that by mimicking the non-
egalitarian emphasis on choice and responsibility, the advocates of responsibility-
sensitive egalitarianism unwittingly inherit some of the non-egalitarians’ vices in their 
theories. (Scheffler 2005, 5?8.)  
In the following sections, I will discuss the critique that Scheffler poses to 
responsibility-sensitive egalitarian theories, in order to apply this critique to Sandel’s 
argument in section 4.2. Scheffler presents various challenges to the normative 
distinction  between  choice  and  circumstance,  and  asserts  that  even  if  there  was  a  
particular luck-egalitarian theory that could escape some of his accusations, all the luck-
egalitarian theories misunderstand the nature of equality as a value and lose touch with 
some of the most important reasons why equality,  as a value,  matters to us in the first  
place. Finally, I will present Scheffler’s point of view in what actually should be central 
in a proper egalitarian principle of distribution, in which he refers to a Rawlsian 
understanding of distributive justice. 
4.1.1. Unconvincing normative distinction between choice and circumstance 
According to Scheffler, the basic element in the principle of responsibility, the 
normative distinction between choice and circumstance, is both philosophically dubious 
and morally implausible. Scheffler claims that this normative distinction cannot bear the 
weight it has been given without incorporating implausible metaphysical categories, and 
accuses the responsibility-sensitive egalitarian project for embracing an unappealing 
tendency  to  moralism.  Furthermore,  he  claims  that  luck-egalitarianism  relies  on  an  
unsustainable justificatory aim when trying to demonstrate that its fundamental position 
is anchored to a moral principle with a broad appeal among people of different classes 
and political orientations.  
                                                                                                                                          
can incorporate “the most powerful idea in the arsenal of the anti-egalitarian right: the idea of choice and 
responsibility” (Cohen 1989, 933).  
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Questionable metaphysical commitments   
Scheffler begins his critique towards the normative distinction between choice and 
circumstance by questioning the possibility of making such a clear distinction between 
the  two.  Scheffler  explains  that  this  distinction  is  considered  to  have  a  large  political  
and economic significance due to the effect of control: voluntary, inequality-justifying 
choices are thought to be under individuals’ control in a way that makes individuals 
responsible for them, whereas unchosen circumstances are not under individuals’ 
control and thus cannot make the individuals responsible for them. Scheffler, however, 
argues that the plausibility of this thesis depends on the definitions of the relevant 
notions  of  choice,  control  and  responsibility.  He  claims  that  only  if  the  distinction  
between choices and circumstances is viewed as a fundamental metaphysical distinction, 
it is capable of bearing the enormous political and economic weight. (Scheffler 2005, 
11?2.)  
According to Scheffler, the required sharp distinction is not plausible. He emphasizes 
that the category of unchosen circumstances is not a clear entity of the contingent 
features of the causal order outside an individual’s control. In addition, it is not obvious 
that  there  are  such  things  as  voluntary  choices  that  are  fully  under  the  control  of  
individuals and that express their agency. Especially, Scheffler states that it is untenable 
to hold that these two categories would be in straight contrast with each other. 
Unchosen  personal  traits  and  social  circumstances  to  which  one  is  born  always  affect  
one’s identity, and people’s voluntary choices are routinely influenced by the unchosen 
features of their personalities, temperaments and social contexts. (Scheffler 2003, 17–
18.) 
Thus,  Scheffler  condemns  the  luck-egalitarians  for  having  a  simplistic  notion  of  a  
voluntary choice and its origins. If the voluntariness of a choice is the criteria for 
passing responsibility for an individual, the criteria is not sensitive to the circumstantial 
features that choices possess, and assumes that people are on the same line in the 
decision-making process. Admittedly, the voluntary nature of a choice is a matter of 
degree, and some voluntary choices are more genuinely voluntary than others.  
For example, the socioeconomic position and cultural background into which one is 
born have a strong influence on a person’s future decisions. Existing wealth, social 
status and networks, as well as cultural knowledge on societal processes presumably 
affect  a  child’s  personality  and  his  future  circumstances.  For  example,  children  of  
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educated parents are more likely to get higher education, and achieving higher 
education has a tendency to increase awareness on health issues. Unhealthy habits, such 
as  smoking,  are  more  prevalent  in  the  lower  socioeconomic  groups,  thus,  it  is  more  
difficult not to smoke in these groups.40 Hence, ‘bad’ decisions concerning employment, 
education and health are more common in certain socioeconomic groups than in others.  
Risky or disadvantageous lifestyles can also be culturally selected despite the 
socioeconomic position. For example, if dangerous rock-climbing is highly respected in 
a  community  and  is  an  essential  element  of  a  high  social  status,  members  of  that  
community are likely to make risky choices. Should these choices be counted wholly 
voluntary if the community expects, and maybe even pressurizes, one to take risks? Is it 
similarly voluntary to gamble in Las Vegas and to gamble in a city where no casinos 
exist? Furthermore, some societal groups are at elevated risk to make pressurized 
choices that lead to poverty. As Anderson mentions, for instance dependent caretakers, 
often vulnerable to poverty and exploitation, are a fundamental example of a made 
‘voluntary choice’, which nonetheless is unjustified to bear the responsibility for the 
choice (Anderson 1999, 297?300). 
As presented in section 3.2, most of the responsibility-sensitive egalitarians suggest that 
these difficulties can be avoided by adjusting and limiting the application of the line 
between choices and circumstances, and the luck-egalitarians typically disagree about 
the factors that should be counted among people’s circumstances and the ones that 
should belong to the category of choice. But as Scheffler notes, the effect of broadening 
the categories casts doubts on the distinction’s capability to support the luck-egalitarian 
main thesis (Scheffler 2003, 17–21). Even though only few luck-egalitarians accept a 
sharp metaphysical distinction between choices and circumstances, Scheffler argues that 
the plausibility of the luck-egalitarian position depends on a conception of genuine 
choice that entails this distinction. And as argued above, the existence of such a sharp 
distinction is not plausible. Hence, it is unclear why choice should matter so much. 
(Scheffler 2005, 12?13.)  
Thus, Scheffler argues that if the limit between choice and circumstance is blurred, the 
distinction will not be able to bear the normative weight it has been given. And because 
                                               
40 For example, Wilkinson and Pickett discuss widely the influence that low socioeconomic status has on 
a person’s life (Wilkinson and Pickett 2009, 31?45).  
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the obscurity of the distinction must necessarily be acknowledged, it remains open on 
what grounds is the distinction able to hold such a normative weight.  
An unappealing tendency towards excessive moralism  
According to Scheffler, a moralistic person is a person who relies on moral judgments 
to an excessive degree, applies the judgments in contexts in which they are not suitable, 
and  uses  them in  a  simplistic  manner.41 Consequently, political moralism is the use of 
moralistic judgments in order to justify political positions, and policies can be moralistic 
if they are based on misplaced moral judgments. Specifically, Scheffler recognizes a 
familiar and long-established form of non-egalitarian political moralism, the “moralism 
of responsibility”. It uses a simplified and highly moralized discourse of individual 
responsibility  as  a  way of  placing  the  focus  of  the  reasons  for  poverty  directly  on  the  
poor themselves, and enables the well-off to feel that they can take credit for their own 
success without needing to be troubled for the less fortunate. (Scheffler 2005, 14–15.)  
The moralism of responsibility entails that there is something immoral about being poor. 
This means that to act morally, one must manage one’s life without any assistance, at 
least  from  the  society.  The  immoral  alternative  would  be  turning  to  the  society’s  
assistance when one was not able to make his livelihood. Taking assistance and not 
coping in one’s life is intrinsically bad, whereas coping is intrinsically good. This 
moralism is obviously simplistic, because the reasons for poverty are much more 
socially constructed, and people from different socioeconomic positions simply have 
different  possibilities  for  not  taking  any  assistance  from  the  society.  The  moralism  of  
responsibility neglects this complexity and assumes that everybody has the same 
possibilities in overcoming the challenges in their lives.  
Scheffler  remarks  that  this  non-egalitarian  moralism  of  responsibility  is  what  luck-
egalitarians try to undermine when turning the principle of responsibility against the 
non-egalitarians by showing its dependence on a flawed understanding about the actual 
sources of inequality in our society (Scheffler 2005, 14–15). Hence, the luck-
egalitarians  aim  to  show  that  the  reasons  for  poverty  often  belong  to  the  category  of  
brute luck. Thus, in Dworkin’s terms, they are the effect of personal and impersonal 
resources, such as the lack of general capacities, wealth-talent and property.  
                                               
41 Scheffler’s conception of moralism resembles what Joel Feinberg outlines. According to Feinberg, 
moralism is the aspiration to enforce a particular morality not as a means to some other social aim, but as 
an end itself. Moralistic claims are claims that pursue to forbid some actions as such, arguing that the 
society would be intrinsically better if those acts would not be conducted in it. (Feinberg 1973, 39?40.) 
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Scheffler argues that even though the luck-egalitarian aim is reasonable, they encounter 
their own form of moralism by incorporating the principle of responsibility. By 
claiming that individuals should bear the costs of their voluntary choices, luck-
egalitarians fail to recognize the social construction of choices and all the circumstantial 
issues that affect the voluntariness of a choice. Thus, simplified moral judgments are 
made about the degree of responsibility that one should bear for his choice. According 
to Scheffler, policies that oversimplified the existence of voluntary choices and their 
relation to responsibility would be harsh, unforgiving and insensitive to context. 
(Scheffler 2005, 15.) 
Scheffler’s accusation of the luck-egalitarian moralism is compelling. It would seem 
harsh that there was a policy that refused societal assistance from the injured rock-
climber, who voluntarily took great risks but was pressurized by his community. 
Similarly, it would be insensitive to context to refuse assistance for lung-cancer 
treatment to a person from low socioeconomic position, who did not genuinely know 
about the risks, or whose societal environment simply did not support a healthier 
lifestyle. Altogether, it seems unforgiving that there was a policy that denied assistance 
from anyone who merely happened to make a bad choice and suffers from his present 
condition.  
In addition, Scheffler discusses the ‘inward looking’ element that the luck-egalitarian 
moralism would introduce as the degree of voluntary choices or circumstances should 
be defined in particular situations. In luck-egalitarian allocating decisions, a person’s 
claim  to  be  compensated  for  a  disadvantage  always  depends  on  a  judgment  about  the  
respective contributions made by his will and by unchosen features of his talents and 
personal circumstances. Thus, luck-egalitarianism encourages a person to look inward 
when deciding whether there is a legitimate claim on fellow citizens, and it encourages 
the fellow citizens to scrutinize the deepest aspects of the person and to judge the degree 
of his responsibility. These judgments would presumably be highly moralized. 42 
(Scheffler 2003, 21; also, Anderson 1999, e.g. 310.)  
The  position  of  Scheffler  and  Anderson  seems  to  be  plausible.  If  the  principles  of  
redistribution really included an assessment of individual responsibility, especially if it 
was made by other individuals, it is true that these judgments could be moralistic; they 
                                               
42  Feinberg notes a similar tendency that appears in moralistic policies. Feinberg notes that if the 
surveillance of morality is extended to the private sphere of life, the detecting authorities will insult 
individual privacy by monitoring the citizen’s private life. (Feinberg 1973, 40.)   
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would emphasize subjectively appreciated moral values that are considered to have 
intrinsic value and that neglect the more objective reality of the complex circumstances 
that  people  are  in.  However,  this  risk  is  not  that  severe  because  redistributive  
institutions are necessarily founded on some objective criteria and common standards. 
Despite this limitation, Scheffler and Anderson still have a point: even though the 
allocating criterion was as objectively constructed as possible, it would be founded on 
the principle of responsibility. As it is difficult to verify the degree of responsibility in 
particular situations, the decisions would require examining the elements of 
responsibility, and this scrutiny could lead to ‘inward looking’ issues.  
Altogether, it remains questionable in what ways the luck-egalitarians can endorse, at 
the same time, the principle of responsibility and the principle that the reasons for 
societal inequality are socially constructed and are not in the domain of individual 
responsibility.  How  could  it  be  justified  that  the  category  of  option  luck  is  hardly  
applicable to the questions with socioeconomic positions but is that with other areas of 
life? Why would the luck-egalitarians recognize the circumstantial features when it 
comes to questions of poverty but not related to other issues?  
The luck-egalitarian response seems to be at a double bind. If the answer is that the 
luck-egalitarians do understand the circumstantial influence of all choices and recognize 
the obscure line between choices and circumstances, the plausibility of the normative 
position of this distinction becomes implausible. What will there be left in the category 
of choices, if everything is influenced by the circumstances? And if the distinction is 
that obscure, how can it bear the normative weight placed on it? On the other hand, if 
the luck-egalitarian response is that, in some cases, or always, they maintain the sharp 
normative distinction, they can be accused of not considering the circumstantial 
influence of choices, or of not being consistent with their principle.  
Unsustainably ambitious justificatory aim 
Scheffler condemns the luck-egalitarians for validating their principle of responsibility 
by asserting that this principle is based on a common moral principle that is intuitive 
and enjoys a broad appeal. This assumption is indeed visible; for example, Dworkin 
suggests that the foundations of his theory are the basic structure of our ethical 
experience and personal ethics, and that changes in them will result in a moral free-fall. 
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Scheffler admits that the principle of responsibility is somewhat overlapping with the 
prevailing political morality of the most liberal societies.43 Scheffler states that the first 
part of the principle of responsibility, inequalities deriving from unchosen features in 
people’s circumstances are unjust, is widely supported; for example, inequalities 
derived from sex or race are generally condemned. However, Scheffler asserts that the 
second part of the principle of responsibility, inequalities are acceptable if they derive 
from the choices people voluntarily make, is not intuitive and does not enjoy broad 
appeal. (Scheffler 2003, 31?33.)  
Scheffler concludes that the luck-egalitarian account of the significance of choice is not 
morally compelling. He states that there are many unchosen personal attributes that may 
be disadvantageous, but for which we do not demand compensation, and people may be 
warranted for compensation regardless of the presence or absence of choice. According 
to Scheffler, it is not a widespread position that, for example, the denial of medical care 
from a patient who ended up in his situation due to voluntary choices and high-risk 
behavior would be fair and acceptable. (Scheffler 2003, 18?9.)  
Despite the intuitive pull in Scheffler’s normative position, its veracity is not obvious. 
The debate about who should pay for the costs of the smokers’ lung cancer treatments 
and obese persons’ medical expenses is not unified, and some parties constantly propose, 
both  in  the  USA  and  in  Europe,  that  the  society  should  not  cover  these  expenses  –  
because the smoker and the obese chose to smoke and have unhealthy lifestyles. 
However, it is either not true that the principle of responsibility would be the unified 
opinion, and that the society at large would consider that the reasons to certain medical 
conditions would be strictly in the individual’s responsibility. It is difficult to predict the 
direction to which this increasing controversy will lead.  
Scheffler marks that the advocates of responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism have done 
interestingly little to defend the principle of responsibility. He suggests that one reason 
for their confidence is that they think their principle derives from Rawls, and because of 
this famous origin, no other arguments would be needed. (Scheffler 2003, 7.) But as 
Scheffler claims, as presented in chapter 3.2, this interpretation of Rawls is misleading. 
The differences between the conception of equality in responsibility-sensitive 
                                               
43 Scheffler recognizes that his categorization of ‘luck-egalitarianism’ and ‘prevailing political morality’ 
is simplified, for it is, of course, certain that not all the notions of luck-egalitarianism and prevailing 
political morality fit in his definitions and examples. Nevertheless, the simplified notions are valid 
enough to show the basic overlapping and diverging elements in luck-egalitarianism and prevailing 
political morality. (Scheffler 2003, 6–7 fn. 2.) 
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egalitarianism and Rawlsian egalitarianism will be further elaborated in the next 
sections.  
4.1.2. The true nature of an egalitarian principle of redistribution 
Thus far, the focus on Scheffler’s criticism has been in the normative position of the 
distinction between choice and circumstance. This debate is extensively present in the 
responsibility-sensitive egalitarian literature. However, the most powerful critique by 
Scheffler concerns an issue that the luck-egalitarians do not themselves discuss that 
much: the justification of the principle of responsibility as such. Scheffler questions the 
notion of equality embedded in this principle and claims that the principle of 
responsibility cannot be the central premise in an egalitarian principle of redistribution. 
As will be argued, the nature of an egalitarian redistribution should derive from Rawls’ 
views, not from the responsibility-sensitive egalitarian theories.  
Scheffler notes that most of the luck-egalitarian literature focus on the things that they 
exactly wish to equalize, often formulated as a correct “metric” equality, such as 
welfare, assuming that justice requires something to be distributed equally. And when 
identified in the right currency of egalitarianism, interpersonal comparisons are 
considered in the qualification of the forms of disadvantages that should receive 
compensation in the name of equality. (Scheffler 2003, 13–17.) Questions are generally 
addressed directly to distribution, without focusing on the implications of distribution. It 
is  claimed  that  equality  follows  when  people  are  treated  equally  with  the  principle  of  
responsibility, everyone having the same worth of compensation deriving from bad luck. 
(Scheffler 2005, 20–22.) 
According to Scheffler, this luck-egalitarian conception of equality, however, diverges 
from a more familiar understanding. He argues that equality is not a distributive ideal in 
the first place, and its aim is not only to compensate for misfortune. Equality is not 
opposed to luck, but to oppression, to heritable hierarchies of social status, and to the 
undemocratic distribution of power. Equality is an ideal that governs the relations in 
which people stand to one another, and it claims that human relations must be 
conducted based on the assumption that everyone’s life is equally important, and that all 
members of the society have an equal standing. Scheffler underlines that instead of 
focusing attention on the differing contingencies of each person’s traits, abilities and 
other circumstances, the irrelevance of individual differences for fundamental social and 
political purposes should be emphasized. (Scheffler 2003, 21–22.) As Scheffler defines, 
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As a moral ideal, it [equality] asserts that all people are of equal worth and 
that there are some claims that people are entitled to make on one another 
simply  by  the  virtue  of  their  status  as  persons.  As  a  social  ideal,  it  holds  
that  a  human society  must  be  conceived  of  as  a  cooperative  arrangement  
among equals, each of whom enjoys the same social standing. As a 
political ideal, it highlights the claims that citizens are entitled to make on 
one another by virtue of their status as citizens, without any need for a 
moralized accounting of the details of their particular circumstances. 
(Scheffler 2003, 22.) 
Thus, Scheffler accuses luck-egalitarianism for not being anchored in an understanding 
of  equality  as  a  moral  value  or  normative  ideal.  Concentrating  merely  on  the  right  
policy of compensation makes it arbitrary and pointless. 44  According to Scheffler, 
distributive implications cannot be an independent standard of equal treatment, thus 
minimizing bad luck through certain distributive institutions and finding the optimal 
way of reflecting the economy based on the distinction between the choices made by 
individuals and their unchosen circumstances. For Scheffler, redistributive policies are a 
tool for achieving equal citizenship and must derive from the egalitarian concern about 
the nature of the relationships among the members of the society and the importance of 
living together as equals.45 Scheffler emphasizes that the questions about distribution 
are important for people who are committed to the social and political value of equality 
because the realization of this equality needs certain kinds of distributive arrangements. 
These arrangements must prevent significant distributive inequalities that originate from 
the translation of natural and social circumstances into economic inequalities. Scheffler 
doubts that luck-egalitarian distributive justice could do this. (Scheffler 2003, 21?23.) 
Scheffler argues that an egalitarian conception of distributive justice cannot have the 
principle of responsibility as its fundamental position, placing the most significant 
weight on the distinction between choices and circumstances, for this position does not 
support the ideal of equal relationships in a society of equals. The principle of 
responsibility questions the idea that all people would be entitled to certain claims 
                                               
44 “If luck-egalitarianism is to be supplied with a compelling motivation, that motivation will need to 
come from somewhere else [than Rawls’ theory]; it cannot simply ride piggy-back on Rawls’ remarks 
about the arbitrariness of the natural lottery or about the need for citizens to take responsibility for their 
ends” (Scheffler 2003, 30–31). 
45 Anne Phillips makes an interesting remark by noticing that the work on equality has often bifurcated in 
a disturbing way. Work on economic equality focuses mainly on the principles that regulate the 
distribution of goods between individuals, neglecting the group nature of contemporary inequality. The 
second strand of debate on social equality focuses on patterns of oppression in social structures, but lacks 
interest in the distribution of economic resources. The two discourses seem to talk past one another. 
However, both are needed in the consideration of an equal society. (Phillips 2000, 237?248.) Contrasted 
to Phillips’s remark, Scheffler’s claim of anchoring the distributive principles in some normative ideal of 
equality reinforces its meaning. 
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simply  by  the  virtue  of  their  status  as  persons  and  citizens,  regardless  of  the  
circumstances and choices made. Furthermore, the luck-egalitarian distributive justice 
does not consider the implications of its distributive model. It only seems to 
contemplate the proper currency of egalitarianism and the proper principle of 
compensation,  and  the  equal  treatment  of  all  people  according  to  the  principle  of  
responsibility. But when the implications are not considered, luck-egalitarianism does 
not have the tools for making sure that all people have an equal standing of being a 
citizen. 
Scheffler asserts that ensuring people’s equal standing in a society is the focus on which 
distributive egalitarianism should concentrate. For ensuring this equal status as citizens, 
Scheffler strongly rests on Rawls’ theory of justice as fairness and primary goods as the 
appropriate basis for interpersonal comparison. According to Rawls, in order to be able 
to participate in society and to have the capacity to develop and pursue a rational plan of 
life, which is constitutive of one’s good, the society must distribute certain primary 
goods that are needed independent from a person’s rational plan of life: basic rights, 
liberties and opportunities, income and wealth, and the social bases of self-respect. 
These goods are essential elements that citizens need in order to be free and equal 
persons (Rawls 1999a, 54; 2005, 180–1). Scheffler himself highlights certain ‘basic 
needs’, i.e., adequate food, clothing, shelter, education and medical care, as a necessary 
means for people to be able to participate in political life and civil society on a footing 
of equality with others (Scheffler 2003, 23)46. 
                                               
46 The primary goods -approach can be applied to the idea that also natural assets would be included in 
redistributive schemes, as presented in section 1.3.2. Thus, the compensable domain would include not 
only societal compensations, but also the distribution of natural assets with genetic enhancement 
technologies. This idea would require the definition of the natural assets that belong to the category of 
basic needs. For example, Buchanan et al. outline a level of a normal competitor that secures functioning 
in the domain of the Rawlsian equality of opportunity. The concept of a normal competitor is developed 
from the notion of normal species functioning: the absence of disease, that is, conditions that are adverse 
departures from the normal species functioning. Buchanan et al., however, add that some natural 
inequalities, which are not defined as diseases, can seriously limit the ability of an individual to be a 
normal competitor; for example, emotional cyclicity that impairs a person’s relationships and work, but 
nonetheless is not severe enough to count as the bipolar affective disorder. Buchanan et al. emphasize that 
these kinds of characteristics should be enhanced within distributive schemes. They claim that the 
primary  moral  obligation  of  the  society,  in  the  name of  justice,  is  to  keep people  close  to  the  level  of  a  
normal competitor so that they are able to participate in political, social and economic life, and get their 
fair share of the normal range of opportunities. (Buchanan et al 2001, 72?5; 121?2.) Buchanan et al. 
further clarify that it is important that the enhancements within the distributive scheme are well-justified, 
because the motivation for societal cooperation derives from the believe that the terms of cooperation are 
fair, and if people realize that scarce medial resources were directed to controversial enhancements, the 
support for public health system could erode. Even though the limit of normal functioning seems arbitrary 
and is unable to always deal with some obscure cases in the grey area, the limit still protects the general 
confidence placed in the fairness of the overall scheme. (Buchanan 2001, 142?4.)  
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According to Scheffler, these basic needs are to be the proper criteria for social and 
political institutions when considering the degree of material inequality that is 
compatible with a conception of a society as a fair system of cooperation among equals. 
The aim of enabling people to be fully cooperating members of a society provides an 
independent standard for judging the disadvantages that should be compensated for. By 
this standard, some disadvantages should be compensated for even if they resulted from 
voluntary choices, whereas others should not be compensated for even if they resulted 
from unfortunate circumstances. The significant criterion is not to be the distinction 
between choices and circumstances, but the requirement to be able to be a cooperating 
member of the society. (Scheffler 2003, 24?30.) 
Thus, Scheffler argues that a proper egalitarian distribution is a distribution that makes 
the shares fair. And what makes shares fair, is not that people are being compensated for 
all unchosen disadvantages, while leaving them to bear the costs of their voluntary 
choices. Scheffler agrees with Rawls on the idea that shares are fair when they are a part 
of a distributive scheme that enables free and equal citizens to pursue their conceptions 
of the good within a framework that embodies an ideal of reciprocity and mutual respect. 
Scheffler refers to Rawls in adducing that primary goods are not to be used in making 
interpersonal comparisons in all situations, but only in questions that arise in regard to 
the basic structure. And the practical basis for these comparisons must lie in the features 
of individual situations that are publicly accessible and that can be appraised without 
violating people’s liberties or subjecting them to unduly intrusive examination. As 
Scheffler points out, this is a striking contrast to the inward-looking focus of luck-
egalitarianism. (Rawls 1999b, 364?5; 1999c, 454-5; Scheffler 2003, 28.) 
Scheffler’s  critique  in  its  entirety  culminates  with  his  remarks  on  the  flawed  
understanding of equality in the responsibility-sensitive egalitarian theories. Even 
though his remarks about the normative distinction between choices and circumstances 
are  crucial  for  his  critique,  his  notions  of  equality  nullify  the  basic  assumption  of  the  
principle of responsibility by claiming that when pursuing societal equality, 
responsibility  in  particular  situations  does  not  matter.  Responsibility  is  not  the  central  
issue to be taken into account when assuring the equal relationships of citizens. The 
issue is to assure each citizen’s ability to cooperate as a full member of the society.  
Comparing the Rawlsian theory with the responsibility-sensitive egalitarian theories 
also clarifies further the unforgiving element that is embedded in the principle of 
71 
 
responsibility. The principle of responsibility cannot guarantee, without additional 
conditions,  that  every  person’s  ability  to  function  as  a  full  member  of  the  society  is  
assured. Considering the egalitarian origin of responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism, 
this aspiration should be of some value. The principle of responsibility would allow one 
to forfeit his basic needs because he made bad decisions. Thus, he would be abandoned 
from societal cooperation and it would be on his responsibility to regain the society’s 
full membership. This kind of a policy is morally implausible, and does not respect a 
person’s status as a citizen. 
4.2. Applying Scheffler’s examination to Sandel’s argument 
Scheffler’s critique of the principle of responsibility, the fundamental position in 
responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism, is quite detrimental. When Sandel’s 
argumentation about the increase in responsibility and the decrease in solidarity, 
induced by the regular use of genetic enhancements, is placed in the context of 
responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism, it becomes vulnerable to Scheffler’s critique. It 
seems indeed harsh and unforgiving to claim that one would not be entitled to 
compensations from the society if he declined from using genetic enhancements, if the 
outcome of that decision would be harmful to the individual. With Scheffler’s analysis, 
it becomes questionable whether the responsibility-sensitive egalitarian approach holds 
the most desirable premises for the development of redistributive institutions in the era 
of genetic enhancements.   
All the above-mentioned parts in Scheffler’s critique can be applied to Sandel’s 
argumentation. It seems to assume an implausible normative distinction between 
choices and circumstances and sees to entail a questionable understanding about the 
societal premise for equality.  
Firstly, Sandel assumes that the decisions concerning genetic enhancements are the 
kinds of voluntary choices that one can be held responsible for. This is one of the 
central issues of the argument. The expanding category of choice is exactly what Sandel 
is concerned about: he opposes the fact that we could choose our genetic factors, 
become masters of our genome, and select desirable traits in the genetic supermarket. 
According to Sandel, this elevated ability of choosing would result in losing our sense 
of giftedness and humility.  
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However, it is not a straightforward matter to point out the factors that affect a person’s 
choices. Scheffler claims that unchosen personal traits and characteristics as well as the 
social circumstances into which one is born all affect a person’s decision-making. 
Hence, components such as cultural background, community beliefs, education, and a 
person’s socioeconomic situation in the society, are likely to affect the decisions one 
makes in his life. These components cause, for example, different attitudes towards 
technical, medical and societal authorities, different knowledge of available health 
services and different lifestyle predispositions. All these varying features would have an 
impact on the decisions people make concerning genetic enhancements. 
In addition, the societal atmosphere could be pressurizing towards the use of 
enhancements, for example, by being judgmental towards the ones who do not want to 
use enhancements. As Buchanan et al. remark, this kind of a pressurizing situation 
exists at present with the use of some mood or memory-enhancing drugs, originally 
meant for medication, as people feel they have to use these drugs just because also 
everybody else does (Buchanan et al. 2001, 185?6). This kind of indirect coercion47 
could also appear with genetic enhancements. If one enhances his competitiveness, the 
others must also do this in order to maintain the same level of performance with the 
enhancers. Thus, introducing genetic enhancements to the scheme of choices could 
actually also restrict the actual domain of choices, when not-choosing genetic 
enhancements could become an impossible choice.  
With these remarks about the decisions that would concern genetic enhancements, it can 
be concluded that the genuine voluntariness of these choices can be questioned. And as 
Scheffler asks, why should the choice matter so much, if the distinction between choices 
and circumstances cannot bear the political and economic weight placed on it?   
Secondly, a tendency towards moralism exists if the principle of responsibility occurred 
in the context of using genetic enhancements. The ‘moralism of responsibility’, 
presented by Scheffler, would have even more substance if the reasons for poverty were, 
incorrectly, reduced to genetic characteristics and if individuals were blamed for not 
enhancing these traits. They would be accused for not using genetic enhancements 
                                               
47  The situations in which the society could pressurize individuals for using enhancements can be 
understood with Philip Pettit’s notions. According to Pettit, true societal freedom to lead one’s life derives 
from a conception of freedom as antipower. Antipower means the control that a person has to his own 
destiny. Possessing antipower is having freedom from arbitrary interference and domination by the ones 
who have better resources or better ability to use them. The promotion of antipower requires protecting 
individuals from domination and the expansion of the domain in which they can exercise undominated 
choices. (Pettit 1996, 589?593.). The absence of antipower could appear as an indirect coercion.  
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without recognizing the social construction of these choices. Thus, simplified moral 
judgments would be made about the degree of responsibility that one should bear for his 
choice. 
Furthermore, the ‘inward-looking’ feature would be present if the reasons for some 
particular poor societal position were examined even more thoroughly; scrutinizing 
whether or not an underprivileged position arise from a characteristic that could have 
been leveled up with genetic enhancements. These examinations and judgments would 
most likely be highly moralized.  
Finally, the argumentation considers the principle of responsibility as a self-evident fact 
and simply assumes that the relation between choosing or not choosing genetic 
enhancements and being responsible for the outcomes is obvious. However, this 
assumption is not that straightforward. As Scheffler notes, despite the overlaps with the 
prevailing political morality, it is not evident that the principle of responsibility would 
enjoy a broad appeal among people with different political orientations. This division 
can  also  be  seen  within  bioethical  authors,  who  disagree  with  the  principle  of  
responsibility used by Sandel, as described in chapter 1.  
Even  though  the  principle  of  responsibility  is,  at  least  in  some  level,  present  in  our  
societies, for example, in the discussion about whether the smokers’ lung cancers 
should be treated with societal assets, this principle is at least not as dominating as its 
proponents suggest. If we believe Scheffler, the principle of responsibility is overrated, 
but  if  we  believe  Dworkin,  it  is  a  founding  element  of  our  ethical  experience.  Sandel  
seems to rely on Dworkin, whichever his reason is: opposing genetic enhancements 
with any possible argument or a true belief that the society actually follows the 
responsibility-sensitive egalitarian doctrine, whether or not he so wishes. Regardless of 
the accurate empirical reality, it is somewhat obvious that the principle of responsibility 
is not the unified opinion.  Thus, it is not certain that the society would actually be that 
harsh towards the ones who, for one reason or another, did not want to enhance 
themselves or their children. Actually, Sandel’s scenario seems to be highly implausible, 
and would probably require unimaginable changes in our political culture. Hence, 
Sandel adopts an unsustainably ambitious justificatory aim. 
These accusations concerning the implausible normative distinction between choices 
and circumstances could be at least mitigated by defending the responsibility-sensitive 
egalitarian  position  with  noting  that  none  of  the  theories  is  as  simple  as  Scheffler  
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assumes. As presented, most of them make exceptions and concessions in the 
distinction between choice and circumstance, and hold different interpretations about 
the nature of voluntary choices and the involuntary features of these choices. With these 
exceptions  and  concessions,  and  the  variety  of  the  definitions  of  choice  and  
circumstance, the responsibility-sensitive egalitarian interpretation of Sandel’s argument 
could be assessed by examining what kind of ‘excusing’ elements could be found in the 
choices that concern genetic enhancements.  
For example, it could be asserted that the wish to decline to use genetic enhancements is 
an expensive taste that derives from unwanted fear towards technology or a 
consequence of a deep religious upbringing, or that decisions about genetic 
enhancements are so pressurized by the society that the voluntariness of a choice is 
undermined. Hence, the degree of responsibility related to the outcomes of 
enhancement-decisions would not be that harsh. However, these exceptions and 
concessions do not save the responsibility-sensitive egalitarian foundation. Despite the 
strength of the defenses, the core of the theory remains philosophically doubtful and 
morally dubious. If the basic principle is misleading, it is difficult to save it with 
exceptions.  
As with Scheffler’s analysis, the deepest source of doubts in the responsibility-sensitive 
egalitarian interpretation of Sandel’s argument can be found in the concept of equality. 
Similarly to the responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism, the scenario in Sandel’s 
argumentation does not recognize certain demands that people are entitled to simply 
because  of  their  status  as  persons  and  citizens.  By placing  the  most  significant  weight  
on the distinction between choices and circumstances, it fails to support the ideal of 
equal relationships in a society of equals. An egalitarian conception of distributive 
justice should guarantee that all people have an equal standing of being a citizen, but 
with the principle of responsibility this assurance is unlikely.  
As Scheffler argues, the appropriate principle for redistributive institutions and the 
proper criteria for deciding, which disadvantages should be compensated for, is not the 
degree of responsibility that people bear for their situations, as the luck-egalitarians 
suggest. The proper question is whether or not the unfortunate situation endangers a 
person’s  ability  to  cooperate  as  a  full  member  of  the  society,  as  the  Rawlsian  
interpretation suggests (Scheffler 2003, 24?30). 
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When applied to the context of genetic enhancements, this means that the proper criteria 
for  societal  compensations  does  not  depend  on  whether  some  outcomes  of  genetic  
characteristics are due to chance or choice, but on whether they affect a person’s status 
as a full member of the society. Thus, some disadvantages should be compensated for 
even if they resulted from voluntary choices, whereas others should not be compensated 
for even if they resulted from unfortunate circumstances. The significant criterion is the 
requirement to be able to be a cooperating member of the society, and the relevant 
question is whether or not the outcome of a decision concerning genetic enhancement 
threaten  this  societal  position.  As  Kamm  argues,  it  is  often  so  that  arguments  for  
providing assistance to others are more related to respect and concern for the value of 
other persons than to whether or not they have got themselves into the situation they are 
in (Kamm 2005, 13).  
A policy that prohibited societal compensations from those who did not choose genetic 
enhancements – or chose the wrong ones – and ended up in a disadvantageous position 
because of their genome, would indeed be harsh and unforgiving. The effects of genetic 
enhancements can reach all spheres of life, throughout one’s life, and it is a not a 
humane vision that the consequence of a bad enhancement decision would affect the 
whole  life  of  a  person.  Some  people  would  be  merely  abandoned  from  the  criteria  of  
being full members of the society. If the equal status of citizens is a pursued goal in a 
society, it must be ensured that the citizens are capable to function in the society, as full 
members.   
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Conclusion: Rethinking Sandel’s argument  
The field of the ethics of human genetics contains diverse scenarios and arguments 
about the era of genetic enhancements. These scenarios can be hopeful or distressed, 
and they can predict the destruction of humanity as we know it, or forecast a better and 
overall happier human life. The predictions are often based on certain philosophical 
premises, and these premises are not necessarily explicit. Without the explicit 
articulation of the argument’s philosophical foundation, it becomes difficult to assess 
the argument’s validity. If an argument in applied philosophy rests on a philosophical 
premise for which plausible critique has been indicated, this philosophical critique 
should be considered also in the assessment of the argument. Arguments in applied 
philosophy must not be separated from their philosophical roots.  
In my thesis, I presented an argumentative analysis on the relation between chance, 
choice and responsibility submitted by Michael Sandel in his The Case against 
Perfection. My analysis introduces a new level of consideration to the assessment of 
Sandel’s argument by suggesting that it can be criticized by employing the critique of 
responsibility-sensitive egalitarian theories.  
I began the thesis by introducing Sandel’s argument that opposes genetic enhancements 
in its entirety, and then proceeded to examine the conceptions of responsibility and 
solidarity in it. In addition, I reviewed the central discussion in the bioethical field 
related to these conceptions. In chapter 2, I explicated the philosophical basis for the 
normative weight that Sandel gives to the maintenance of solidarity in society: for 
Sandel, solidarity is an intrinsic element of the common good and a good life. 
Understanding this teleological reasoning is essential for the claim I constructed in 
chapters 3 and 4.  
In chapter 3, I demonstrated that Sandel’s argument about genetic enhancement shares 
premises with responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism. Before this demonstration, 
Sandel’s compatibility with egalitarian theories had to be substantiated: in order to 
suggest similarities between Sandel’s argument and responsibility-sensitive 
egalitarianism, the compatibility of Sandel’s philosophy and egalitarian theories, from 
which  responsibility-sensitive  egalitarianism  originates,  must  be  indicated.  Hence,  I  
argued that Sandel and Rawls, the archetype of egalitarianism, share the same 
egalitarian basic principle: the justification of redistributive institutions for the 
mitigation  of  natural  and  social  contingencies.  However,  what  was  of  utmost  
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importance  in  my  argumentation  was  that  even  though  Sandel  and  Rawls  share  this  
principle, they arrive to it with very dissimilar reasoning: Sandel’s justification has its 
origins in the teleological pursuance of good life and common good, while Rawls’ 
validation is based on deontology and individual rights.  
After this demonstration, I continued to argue that the relation between responsibility 
and luck that Sandel presents in his argument that opposes genetic enhancements 
includes the responsibility-sensitive egalitarian principle of responsibility as its 
foundation: inequalities are unjust if they derive from features that are outside an 
individual’s control, but otherwise they are just. Similar to this thinking, Sandel outlines 
a  view which  suggests  that  if  people  had  control  over  their  genetic  characteristics  and  
did not choose genetic enhancements for improving them, they would be held 
responsible for the possible disadvantages deriving from their characteristics. This 
responsibility indicates that people could be blamed for their deficiencies, and therefore 
the social motivation for societal compensations for the disadvantaged, and thus, 
solidarity, would be eroded.  
The  twofold  conclusion  of  chapter  3  is  that  1)  Sandel’s  philosophy  in  general  can  be  
related to egalitarian theories, because it contains the egalitarian basic principle. This 
similarity enables suggesting a relation between Sandel and responsibility-sensitive 
egalitarianism, which originates from egalitarianism. 2) The relation of chance, choice 
and responsibility in Sandel’s argument concerning genetic enhancements is based on 
the principle of responsibility of the responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism. Therefore, 
the critique of these theories can be applied to Sandel’s argument.  
In chapter 4, I revisited Sandel’s argument with the responsibility-sensitive egalitarian 
interpretation. I began by introducing Samuel Scheffler’s critique to responsibility-
sensitive egalitarianism. Scheffler’s conclusion was that the responsibility-sensitive 
egalitarian doctrine is philosophically doubtful and morally dubious, and is based on a 
flawed understanding of equality. According to Scheffler, the redistributive principle in 
an egalitarian theory cannot be founded on a principle of responsibility but should be 
based on a Rawlsian principle of primary goods: each citizen ought to be guaranteed 
certain assets of basic needs, regardless of the responsibility and control that people 
have in particular situations.  
At the end of chapter 4, I applied Scheffler’s critique to Sandel’s argumentation. I 
asserted that Sandel’s scenario about the era of genetic enhancements is as 
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philosophically doubtful and morally dubious as Scheffler has presented in his critique. 
I argued that if people were denied societal compensations because of not choosing 
genetic enhancements, the result could be deserting a group of citizens under the level 
of basic needs that are required for being able to function as full members of the society. 
This neglect cannot be justified in a society that wishes to give value to the equal 
respect and concern for its members. Even if certain responsibility-sensitive egalitarian 
theories would add a criterion of basic needs in itself, the basic principle of that theory 
could still not guarantee the level of primary goods for the members of the society.  
In  other  words,  the  result  in  chapter  4  is  that  1)  the  principle  of  responsibility  of  
responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism is not philosophically valid and morally 
compelling, and it is not a suitable foundation for an egalitarian theory and, therefore, 2) 
the relation between chance, choice and responsibility in Sandel’s argument is not 
philosophically valid and morally compelling, and is not a suitable foundation for an 
egalitarian theory.   
What, then, does the contemplation in this thesis reveal about Sandel’s argumentation? 
One issue that complicates the question is the one noted in section 3.4, which examined 
Sandel’s relation to responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism, that we do not know whether 
Sandel’s argument is normative or descriptive. If it is normative, Sandel supports the 
responsibility-sensitive egalitarian principle and merely highlights the problems that this 
principle would produce if genetic enhancements were introduced. On the other hand, if 
Sandel provides a descriptive argument, he might not support the responsibility-
sensitive egalitarian doctrine, but instead only predicts an undesirable future scenario.   
A reason to believe that Sandel does not actually support the responsibility-sensitive 
egalitarian doctrine can be derived from his other philosophical writings. A clear 
fundamental premise for his philosophical thinking is present in these writings: the 
aspiration for preserving and cultivating a strong sense of community and social 
solidarity.  
This premise seems incompatible with the responsibility-sensitive egalitarian principle 
of  responsibility  which  does  not  foster  social  solidarity  and  sense  of  shared  fate  but  
instead focuses on blaming people on different aspects and degrees of individual 
responsibility. Therefore, it is not plausible that Sandel would endorse it. If Scheffler’s 
critique is valid in claiming that the responsibility-sensitive egalitarian theories are 
philosophically doubtful and morally dubious, then the principle of responsibility is 
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probably not the best agenda to engender a society in which the sense of belonging, 
solidarity and a feeling of shared fate flourish. The sense of community is presumably 
better fostered by assuring that every person is able to function as a full member of the 
society48 and not by tracking the degrees of responsibility that people bear in their 
choices. Thus, if Sandel makes a normative argument that supported the responsibility-
sensitive egalitarian doctrine, his argument would be in contradiction with the rest of his 
philosophical thinking.  
This analysis suggests that Sandel has other reasons for discussing the principle of 
responsibility than its genuine endorsement. The proposed alternatives suggest that 
either Sandel merely presumes that the present or the future society operates according 
to the principle of responsibility, or that Sandel, an opponent of genetic enhancements, 
is trying to present a disquieting scenario about the future with genetic enhancements. 
Both alternatives ignore Scheffler’s remark that the principle of responsibility is not at 
least that self-evident in the society that it is presented to be. A question that will remain 
open is why Sandel adopted the principle of responsibility in his argument. 
If Sandel abandoned the principle of responsibility, he would have more difficulties in 
advocating a full ban of genetic enhancements. It is more convincing to oppose 
enhancements with this principle, for indeed the idea of bursting responsibility and 
eroding solidarity is disquieting. If the aim is to raise anxiety, and Scheffler’s critique is 
plausible, Sandel’s responsibility-sensitive egalitarian scenario is successful. Although 
some authors, such as Dworkin and Harris, support genetic enhancements in spite of the 
principle of responsibility, many others reject enhancements if they induced those 
alterations in our moral landscape that Sandel predicts.  
In contrast, if Sandel admitted that the task of redistributive institutions of society is to 
assure a full cooperative membership for everyone, opposing the use of genetic 
enhancements on the ground of eroding solidarity and increasing responsibility would 
be implausible. This is because even though people declined to use genetic 
enhancements or chose the wrong ones, the society would still assure their basic needs, 
simply because of their statuses as persons and citizens. This scenario is not so 
disquieting.      
                                               
48 Nevertheless, it is clear that the suggested solution for Sandel is not to alter his argumentation into a 
Rawlsian one, because Sandel still has major critique against the Rawlsian conception of the 
unencumbered self, as presented in chapter 2. However, it is possible to support the redistributive ideal of 
assuring full membership of society and primary goods without adopting Rawls’ full theory about the 
priority of the right over the good.  
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Various predictions about the future with possible genetic enhancements exist. Often 
these predictions do not reveal their philosophical premises, but merely focus on 
outlining different scenarios. Sandel’s argument in The Case against Perfection is  an  
example  of  that  kind  of  prediction.  To  be  able  to  truly  contemplate  the  plausibility  of  
the scenarios, it is important to go back to their philosophical premises and examine the 
credibility of these premises.  
Whether  Sandel  endorses  the  principle  of  responsibility  or  merely  predicts  a  future  
according to it, the assessment of Sandel’s argument requires that the premises in it are 
analyzed.  The  fact  that  Sandel  employs  the  principle  of  responsibility  in  the Case 
against Perfection is either philosophically inconsistent, if his argument is normative, 
or, if his argument is descriptive, he outlines an implausible view about the foundations 
of the society.  
After analyzing the premises in Sandel’s argumentation, I conclude that Sandel’s 
forecast on the changing notions of responsibility and solidarity is not straightforward. 
By identifying that Sandel’s argumentation is based on the responsibility-sensitive 
egalitarian principle of responsibility, the relation between chance, choice and 
responsibility in it can be assessed analytically by employing the critique of the 
principle of responsibility. This analysis indicates that the relation between increasing 
responsibility and decreasing solidarity in Sandel’s argument is philosophically unsound 
and morally implausible.    
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